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A TRADITIONAL AND TEXTUALIST ANALYSIS
OF THE GOALS OF ANTITRUST: EFFICIENCY,
PREVENTING THEFT FROM CONSUMERS, AND
CONSUMER CHOICE
Robert H. Lande*
This Article ascertains the overall purpose of the antitrust statutes in two
very different ways. First, it performs a traditional analysis of the
legislative history of the antitrust laws by analyzing relevant legislative
debates and committee reports. Second, it undertakes a textualist or “plain
meaning” analysis of the purpose of the antitrust statutes, using Justice
Scalia’s methodology. It does this by analyzing the meaning of key terms as
they were used in contemporary dictionaries, legal treatises, common law
cases, and the earliest U.S. antitrust cases, and it does this in light of the
history of the relevant times.
Both approaches demonstrate that the overriding purpose of the antitrust
statutes is to prevent firms from stealing from consumers by charging them
supracompetitive prices. When firms use their market power to raise prices
to supracompetitive levels, purchasers pay more for their goods and
services, and these overcharges constitute a taking of purchasers’ property.
Economic efficiency was only a secondary concern. In addition, the
textualist approach leads to the surprising conclusion that neither the
Sherman Act nor the Clayton Act contain an exception for monopolies
attained by efficient business conduct. A “plain meaning” analysis of the
antitrust statutes reveals that they are supposed to prevent and condemn all
privately created monopolies.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article determines the overall purpose of the antitrust statutes in two
very different ways. First, it performs a traditional analysis of the
legislative history of the antitrust laws by analyzing relevant legislative
debates and committee reports. Second, it undertakes a textualist or “plain
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meaning” determination of the purpose of the antitrust statutes, using
Justice Scalia’s methodology. It does this by analyzing the meaning of key
terms as they were used in contemporary dictionaries, legal treatises,
common law cases, and the earliest U.S. antitrust cases, and it does this in
light of the history of the times.
Both approaches demonstrate that the overriding purpose of the antitrust
statutes is to prevent firms from stealing from consumers by charging them
supracompetitive prices. When firms use their market power to raise prices
to supracompetitive levels, consumers pay more for their goods and
services, and these overcharges constitute a taking of consumers’ property.
Economic efficiency was only a secondary concern. In addition, the
textualist approach leads to the surprising conclusion that neither the
Sherman Act nor the Clayton Act contain an exception for monopolies
attained through efficient business conduct. A “plain meaning” analysis of
the antitrust statutes concludes that they are supposed to prevent and
condemn all privately created monopolies.
The importance of this distinction can be illustrated by an extraordinary
document that recently turned up: the inaugural speech by the first candid
efficiency purist to head either the Antitrust Division or the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC)!1 It says the following:
Today I’m announcing three important changes in enforcement
priorities: First, I’m going to permit most mergers to monopoly even if
postmerger prices are likely to rise dramatically, so long as the merger is
likely to lead to even a tiny cost savings. For example, even a 10 percent
price rise usually will be fine so long as costs fall by 1/4 of 1 percent.2
Second, I’m going to permit many cartels, even when firms fix prices
or rig bids.3 I’ll be especially unlikely to prosecute cartels involving
necessities, because demand tends to be highly inelastic and therefore
unlikely to cause allocative inefficiency.4 For example, an insulin cartel
1. This is a hypothetical whose purpose is to illustrate some of the effects of an
antitrust policy that is both candid and solely based upon the goal of maximizing economic
efficiency.
2. See Timothy J. Muris, The Efficiency Defense Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
30 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 381, 387 tbl.1, 420 (1980). For the origin of this approach to
merger analysis, see generally Oliver E. Williamson, Economies As an Antitrust Defense:
The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968); see also Alan A. Fisher, Frederick I.
Johnson & Robert H. Lande, Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 777,
809–13 (1989), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1134826.
3. For explanations of bid-rigging scenarios that do not produce allocative
inefficiencies and additional examples, see Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, The Rule of
Reason and the Goals of Antitrust: An Economic Approach, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 471, 497–
503 (2012).
4. Because a monopolist produces less than would be produced under competitive
conditions, unless demand is completely inelastic, some resources that would otherwise have
been used to make the monopoly product will instead be used for other purposes—ones that
consumers value demonstrably less. This misallocation of resources results in diminished
satisfaction of society’s wants and, thus, in terms of what society values, a reduction of
society’s total wealth. This effect is termed “allocative inefficiency” or the deadweight
welfare loss. Elimination of monopoly pricing would, ceteris paribis, increase society’s
total wealth and, therefore, increase consumer satisfaction. For a formal proof that
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that raises prices by 300 percent would be fine because demand is
probably inelastic within the relevant range.5 The more essential
something is to a large percentage of consumers, the more likely it is a
product for which everyone is welcome to fix prices.6
Finally, I’m going to permit every news related merger and joint
venture. It wouldn’t bother me if every hard copy and online source of
news merged and there was only one source of news left in the United
States. The inefficiency effects of any resulting market power would be
extremely difficult to demonstrate because news organizations compete
with so much else for advertising and personnel. Yet, these transactions
would result in a tremendous cost savings due to the elimination of
duplicative newsgathering operations, so they would be net efficient.7
I’m announcing these policy changes because they follow from the
approach to antitrust I think best: the efficiency-only approach. The
efficiency approach leads to these policies due to the relatively small size
of the allocative inefficiency effects of monopoly power,8 the fact that
inefficiency effects of market power are extraordinarily difficult to prove
accurately or convincingly in a litigation setting,9 and the likely existence
of efficiencies from most practices that are large enough to offset the
resulting inefficiencies.10
monopoly pricing causes allocative inefficiency, see EDWIN MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS:
THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 208–31 (5th ed. 1982).
5. Hypothetical adapted from Steven C. Salop, Question: What is the Real and Proper
Antitrust Welfare Standard? Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 336, 340 n.14 (2010).
6. Many pharmaceuticals would qualify, as would house keys, perhaps even gasoline in
some circumstances; the list goes on and on.
7. If every news company merged in the long run, this could result in x-inefficiency. I
would of course give a higher priority to relatively certain cost savings and would discount
future x-inefficiency effects because of their speculative nature and the time value of money.
8. The allocative inefficiency effects of market power are remarkably small. The
standard monopoly power diagram, see infra Part I.B.5, shows the allocative inefficiency
effects of market power as being relatively large—one half as large as the transfer effects.
This ratio, however, is only theoretical and is based upon some very unlikely assumptions.
See infra Part I.B.5. The best empirical results show that they normally are only between 20
and 3 percent as large as the transfer effects. The allocative inefficiency effects of market
power are usually so small that they are not much more than a rounding error in the analysis.
9. Enforcers and other plaintiffs have only been able to demonstrate the size of the
allocative inefficiency effects of market power in court on rare occasions. I have found only
one instance where this was done successfully. See infra Part II.B.
10. There often will be cost savings from firms getting together, even when they get
together to fix prices. Savings can include a large number of types of efficiencies, such as
decreased advertising and other sales expenses, and consumers no longer will have to engage
in inefficient comparison shopping (after all, prices will be identical). See ROBERT H. BORK,
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 435 (1978). Bork lists seven
efficiencies that can arise from horizontal price fixing, including optimizing local sales
efforts, providing the mechanism for the transfer of information, assisting the achievement of
advertising economies of scale, and breaking down reseller cartels to prevent the misuse of
local reseller monopolies. Id.
These savings often will tend to cause me not to challenge an otherwise suspect
cartel—almost no matter how high prices rise. Professor Williamson and others have
showed that, for example, even a trivial, one fourth of 1 percent cost saving, usually will
justify a merger likely to increase prices by ten percent. See supra note 2. Even a 1 percent
cost savings often can offset the allocative inefficiency from a 20 percent increase. Id. This
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Except in those rare circumstances when we can prove the size of the
allocative inefficiency we won’t challenge mergers or collusion.11 Even
in these cases, moreover, unless prices rise so much that we can prove that
the inefficiencies outweigh the cost savings, I won’t prosecute.
Why am I adopting the efficiency view of antitrust? Because I think
it’s the best approach. Candidly, I didn’t even try to discern the intent of
the Congress when it enacted the antitrust laws. I didn’t examine the
laws’ legislative history or perform a “textualist” or “plain reading”
analysis to determine whether Congress wanted to protect consumer
surplus from being taken by price fixers or bid riggers in the form of
supracompetitive pricing, or whether Congress cared about consumer
choice. I think the goals of the antitrust laws are ambiguous, so I’m going
to do what I think best.12

It is extremely unlikely that anyone who heads the Antitrust Division or
the FTC would ever be so candid and transparent. But this sketch of some
of the effects of an efficiency-only policy shows the importance of the
inquiry that will follow. This Article will attempt to determine the goals of
the current U.S. antitrust statutes in two very different ways.

means that even though consumers will pay much more and all of this increase—as well as
the cost savings—will go to the monopolist, this does not matter. So long as the merger is
likely to be net efficient, and thus benefit society as a whole, I am going to allow it. In
addition, there surely will be some cases where the enforcers will be able to prove that
innovation will diminish. For a discussion of this prinicple, see Neil W. Averitt & Robert H.
Lande, Using the “Consumer Choice” Approach to Antitrust Law, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 175,
196–237 (2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1121459.
11. I certainly believe that the allocative inefficiency effects of market power could be
proven in court under the right circumstances. But this is largely unknown territory. I have
conceded that the transfer effects of market power do not count, and it usually will be
extremely difficult for us to prove the size of the relatively small inefficiencies loss from
market power. I am especially worried about challenging cartels where I am not sure of
victory because if I fail enough times to show that allocative inefficiency exists and is so
large it outweighs the cost savings, this could be the end of the per se rule against price
fixing. Suppose, for example, I can only show a successful efficiency balance five times out
of the first ten cases where defendants resist my prosecution of their cartel. The courts could
erode or even repeal the per se rule because they would no longer believe price fixing or bid
rigging is almost always anticompetitive. It is not impossible that if I have a tremendous
amount of trouble proving that either bid rigging or cartels are net inefficient, for
administrative simplicity the courts eventually could switch to per se legality.
12. In light of my approach, I realize that I will be in no position to criticize my
successor if he or she decides that the antitrust laws are all about fighting the political power
of big business or something else I consider crazy. They have as much right as I do to
declare the statutes ambiguous and read almost whatever values they like into antitrust.
The courts might, of course, constrain me, or my successors. That is, unless I can
convince the courts that congressional intent is ambiguous or irrelevant. If I win with this
argument I will be able to impose my view of optimality for a while and, I concede, maybe
my successors will as well. I do concede, however, that sharp changes in antitrust policy
would not be good for the country.
Even if the courts constrain me, I can still have significant effects on our economy
until this happens. Specifically, this will mean that lots of mergers to monopolies, joint
ventures, bid rigging, and cartels will go forward. Some will be challenged by state
enforcers, but there are not enough of them to take up the slack. Others will be challenged
by private plaintiffs.
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The first will be a traditional determination of congressional intent by
examining the relevant legislative history: the congressional debates and
committee reports. A traditional legislative history analysis of this issue
was first performed by Judge Robert Bork in 1966, when he famously
concluded that the legislative history showed that Congress’s sole reason
for passing the Sherman Act was to enhance economic efficiency.13 I
reanalyzed this same legislative history in 1982, except that these results
concluded that Congress’s primary concern was with preventing wealth
transfers (a polite term for theft) from consumers to firms with market
power, and that economic efficiency was only a secondary concern.14
Subsequent to this research a new approach to statutory interpretation has
emerged, championed by Justice Scalia and known as the “textualist,” “fair
reading,” or “plain meaning” approach.15 To my knowledge neither Justice
Scalia nor anyone else has ever undertaken a textualist analysis of the
antitrust statutes to determine whether the goal of these statutes is to
enhance efficiency, to prevent firms with market power from using market
power to steal from consumers, to enhance consumer choice, or to
accomplish some other purpose. This Article will undertake this task.
The results of both analyses demonstrate that Congress’s primary
concern was not with economic efficiency. Rather, the primary goal of the
antitrust statutes can, overall, best be described as a concern with the
transfer effects of market power.16 Congress wanted consumers to be able
to pay competitive prices—not supracompetitive prices—and condemned
the use of market power to extract wealth (i.e., steal) from consumers. An
alternative way to describe this concern is that the property right we today
call “consumers’ surplus” was defined and awarded to consumers.
Supracompetitive prices were a concern not because of the allocative
inefficiency they created, but because they constituted the theft of
“consumers’ surplus” by cartels and other firms that violated the antitrust
laws.17
To be sure, some circumstances require special consideration: situations
where non-price or choice competition should be paramount,18 cases
13. Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON.
7, 26 (1966).
14. Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers As the Original and Primary Concern of
Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 69–70 (1982),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2065413.
15. For an explanation of this approach, see infra Part I.B.
16. The transfer concern is not the same thing as a concern with the distribution of
wealth. When a poor person steals from a rich person, this is an unfair transfer of wealth—
an improper taking of property—even though it results in a more even distribution of wealth.
The wealth of the parties is irrelevant to the transfer or taking issue. This would be true for
both a pickpocket and a cartel.
17. For an illustration of the allocative inefficiency effects and wealth transfer effects of
market power, see infra Part II.A.
18. In some relatively unusual circumstances a price approach will not work very well.
In circumstances such as the earlier hypothetical merger of every newsgathering operation in
the United States, the congressional concern with non-price issues best can be described in
terms of “consumer choice” or non-price competition. See infra Part III.
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involving monopsony power,19 and complexities involving overcharges to
business consumers or overcharges that are passed through the distribution
chain to indirect purchasers.20 Efficiency was indeed a concern of the
law.21 Nevertheless, the overriding goal of the antitrust statutes was to
protect consumers from theft. This Article’s textualist analysis of section 2
of the Sherman Act, moreover, shows that the law is supposed to prevent
and condemn all privately created monopolies, with no exception for
monopolies created by accident or efficient business conduct.22
This Article concludes with a brief analysis of why an efficiency-only
antitrust policy would be unduly weak: the relatively small size of the
allocative inefficiency effects of market power, the tremendous difficulties
an efficiency-only policy would place on the enforcers to prove
anticompetitive effects in court, and the almost intractable difficulties that
are likely to arise when we try to balance allocative efficiency and cost
savings in court.
I. WHAT CONGRESS ENACTED: STEALING FROM CONSUMERS AS THE
LYNCHPIN OF ANTITRUST
There are many possible approaches to ascertaining what Congress
intended when it enacted the antitrust laws.23 This assumes, of course, that
one honestly wants to do this. One might not want to determine Congress’s
intention, preferring instead to give wide latitude in statutory interpretation
to the enforcers and/or the courts. Another implicit, although unstated,
issue is the desire by government enforcers and courts to assume the power
that comes from the ability to interpret statutes. Although of course they
would deny this intention, the more power they desire, the less likely they
are to faithfully attempt to discern congressional goals. Rather, they are
19. A “monopsony” is a market with a single buyer. By contrast, a “monopoly” is a
market with a single seller. See John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental
Goal of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 191, 233–36 (2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1113927.
20. Professor Kirkwood observes that although Congress wanted to protect all
consumers, regardless of where they were in the products’ distribution chain, their primary
focus was on protecting the “consumers” in markets in which sellers with market power
operate. This should occur even if these consumers are businesses that sell these products to
other consumers, and with recognition that consumers in downstream markets could be
harmed. This also could be termed a concern with protecting “purchasers.” See John B.
Kirkwood, The Essence of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers and Small Suppliers from
Anticompetitive Conduct, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425 (2013). In light of multistage
distribution, it often is difficult or even impossible to determine whether certain practices
have harmed “real consumers” or “end users” or “ultimate consumers.” We could, instead,
speak fairly in terms of “protecting purchasers” or “protecting buyers” who often will be
dealing directly with the firms in question.
21. See infra notes 47–50.
22. See discussion infra Part I.B.3.
23. See generally James J. Brudney & Corey Ditzlear, The Decline and Fall of
Legislative History? Patterns of Supreme Court Reliance in the Burger and Rehnquist Eras,
89 JUDICATURE 220 (2006); Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative History
in the Supreme Court, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 205 (2000).
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more likely to find that congressional intent is ambiguous and impossible to
ascertain, thus freeing them, within limits, to interpret the statutes as they
choose.24
This is an especially important subject because the issue of how
much deference the decision makers should give to Congress is not an allor-nothing decision. The result will often depend upon which side has the
burden of proof and how certain the decision makers thinks they should be.
If the standard is proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to what Congress
intended, there probably is no way to determine its ultimate goals. But is a
criminal law standard of proof appropriate?
Everyone agrees we should faithfully interpret and implement the words
of the statutes if they are clear.25 But what do we do when the words are
ambiguous? We could attempt to interpret ambiguity by using our best
judgment as to what Congress would have done if it had considered the
question.26 Although there are any number of approaches to dealing with
the issue of congressional intent,27 this Article will discuss the two that
appear to be the most common and prominent: (1) a traditional or
“purposivist”28 analysis of the debates in Congress and the relevant
committee reports at the time the antitrust laws were enacted; (2) a
“textualist” or “fair reading” approach that uses only the “plain meaning” of
the words of the statutes as those words were commonly used when the
antitrust laws were enacted.

24. Of course, this approach implicitly frees the enforcers’ and judges’ successors to do
the same, and thus to reverse their decisions. Stare decisis might, of course, constrain them
to some extent. Moreover, some enforcers could assume their viewpoint will prevail forever
and thus be eager to take the risk that their successors will never be in a position to
implement, for example, a “big business is bad/small business is good” approach to antitrust,
at least not in their lifetime.
25. United States v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929) (“[W]here the language of
an enactment is clear, and construction according to its terms does not lead to absurd or
impractical consequences, the words employed are to be taken as the final expression of the
meaning intended.”); see also ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW 16 (1997) (“[W]hen the text of a statute is clear, that is the end of the
matter.”).
26. As Judge Bork noted, the task of ascertaining the will of Congress should be “an
attempt to construct the thing we call ‘legislative intent’ using conventional methods of
collecting and reconciling the evidence provided by the Congressional Record.” Bork, supra
note 13, at 7 n.2.
27. See Tiefer, supra note 23, at 207–10.
28. A traditional analysis of the legislative history of a statute, one that relied upon the
congressional debates and committee reports, is sometimes called a “purposivist” analysis.
See generally Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Statutes in Common Law Courts, 91 TEX. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013); see also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 18 (2012) (“So-called purposivism, which has been called
‘the basic judicial approach these days.’”).
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A. The Traditional Legislative History Approach: Using Congressional
Debates and Committee Reports29
The legislative history of the Sherman Act30 contains many statements of
concern by Senator Sherman31 and other legislators32 that the trusts and
other businesses of the period had or would likely acquire enough power to
raise prices. Judge Bork summarized this portion of the debates eloquently:
“The touchstone of illegality is raising prices to consumers. There were no
exceptions.”33 There is little disagreement that supracompetitive pricing
was the preoccupation of the debates.34
The key question, however, is precisely why Congress objected when
trusts, cartels, and monopolies raised prices to consumers.
Supracompetitive prices cause two direct economic effects: the transfer of
surplus from consumers to cartels (i.e., the stealing effect), and allocative
inefficiency. Which one was Congress’s concern? Were both?
The Sherman Act’s legislative debates make this clear.35 For example,
Senator Sherman termed the higher prices “extortion,”36 and “extorted
wealth.”37 One Congressman referred to the overcharges as “robbery,”38
and another complained that the trusts, “without rendering the slightest
equivalent,” have “stolen untold millions from the people.”39 Another
Congressman complained that the beef trust “robs the farmer on the one
hand and the consumer on the other.”40 Another declared that the trusts
were “impoverishing” the people through “robbery.”41 Another declared
that monopolistic pricing was “a transaction the only purpose of which is to
29. This section is based upon material contained in Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 19,
and Lande, supra note 14. The author wrote these pieces because he believes in the
soundness of the traditional approach to ascertaining congressional intent.
30. For similar statements from the legislative history of the Clayton Act, see Lande,
supra note 14, at 128. For similar statements from the legislative history of the CellerKefauver Act, see id. at 135–36. For similar statements from the legislative history of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, see id. at 112–14.
31. See 21 CONG. REC. 2456 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman) (noting that trusts tend
to “advance the cost to the consumer”); Id. at 2460 (statement of Sen. Sherman) (observing
that it is sometimes contended that trusts reduced prices to the consumer, “but all experience
shows that this saving of cost goes to the pockets of the producer”); Id. at 2462 (statement of
Sen. Sherman) (asking Congress to protect the public from trusts that “restrain commerce,
turn it from its natural courses, increase the price of articles, and therefore diminish the
amount of commerce”).
32. See, e.g., id. at 2558 (statement of Sen. Pugh) (noting that trusts effectively
“destroy[] competition in production and thereby increas[e] prices to consumers”).
33. Bork, supra note 13, at 16.
34. See id.; Lande, supra note 14, passim.
35. See Bork, supra note 13 (believing that allocative history was the primary concern of
the legislature).
36. 21 CONG. REC. 2461 (quoting Sen. Sherman).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 2614 (statement of Rep. Coke).
39. Id. at 4101 (statement of Rep. Heard).
40. Id. at 4098 (statement of Rep. Taylor).
41. Id. at 4103 (statement of Rep. Fithian) (reading, with apparent approval, a letter from
a constituent).
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extort from the community . . . wealth which ought . . . to be generally
diffused over the whole community.”42 Finally, one complained: “They
aggregate to themselves great, enormous wealth by extortion.”43
Do terms like “stealing,” “robbery,” “extortion,” and “stolen wealth”
sound like synonyms for allocative inefficiency? Or is it more likely that
Congress in effect awarded the property right to what we today call
“consumers’ surplus” to consumers? Under this view, the taking of
consumers’ surplus by cartels and other business arrangements that violate
the antitrust laws constitutes in effect the theft of consumer’s property.
Congress wanted to protect consumers who purchased products and
services; it made no distinction between wealthy and poor consumers, direct
and indirect consumers, or business consumers and individual end-user
consumers.44 Nor did Congress seem concerned about the issue of who
ultimately bore the cost of monopoly overcharges (i.e., Congress did not
seem concerned whether direct purchasers absorbed all the overcharges or
passed all or part of them on to the next level in the chain of distribution).45
Rather, Congress could see that prices to those who purchased from a
42. Id. at 2728 (statement of Sen. Hoar).
43. Id. at 1768 (statement of Sen. George).
44. As Prof. Kirkwood shows, the best way to phrase this concern is a primary concern
with the direct consumers or purchasers in the markets at issue. See generally Kirkwood,
supra note 20. Thus, the best and most straightforward way to embrace Congress’s concern
for “consumers” would be to equate it to a primary concern with the direct purchasers of
goods and services sold by cartels, monopolies, etc. In other words, any direct purchaser
should be deemed a “consumer” for antitrust purposes, regardless of what they decided to do
with the good or service they purchased.
It would be a complicated, time-consuming, and useless task to attempt to determine
precisely what happened to each good and service sold by a cartel. Depending upon the
product, some would be consumed by direct purchasers, some would be resold, and others
would be incorporated into different products. Otherwise, every price rise caused by a
monopoly, cartel, etc., would have to be examined through an oftentimes long chain of
production and distribution to determine whether it had been absorbed by intermediaries or
whether, and to what degree, it had been passed on to consumers. This can be a very
difficult undertaking. Firms that otherwise would have violated the antitrust laws should not
be excused on the grounds that they “only” harmed business purchasers. Many of the
complexities that would arise if the standard were limited to the welfare of ultimate
consumers are analyzed in Gregory J. Werden, Monopsony and the Sherman Act: Consumer
Welfare in a New Light, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 707 (2007). These problems can all be avoided,
however, by focusing only upon the direct purchasers.
45. See generally Lande, supra note 14. While Congress frequently referred to
“consumers,” it did not appear to care only about ultimate consumers. Rather,
Congress wanted to protect all who were overcharged. Id. Moreover, a number of decisions
explicitly refer to protecting buyers, purchasers, or customers (not just consumers). For
example, the Supreme Court noted in Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v.
California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 538 (1983): “As the legislative
history shows, the Sherman Act was enacted to assure customers the benefits of price
competition.” Id.; see also Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481,
489 (1968) (“The reason is that he has paid more than he should and his property has been
illegally diminished, for had the price paid been lower his profits would have been higher
. . . . As long as the seller continues to charge the illegal price, he takes from the buyer more
than the law allows.”); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 904 (6th Cir. 2003)
(“[T]he very purpose of antitrust law is to ensure that the benefits of competition flow to
purchasers of goods affected by the violation.” (citing to the district court opinion)).
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monopoly or cartel increased and enacted the antitrust laws to prevent this
from happening.46
Of course, the Congresses that enacted the Sherman Act,47 FTC Act,48
Clayton Act,49 and Celler-Kefauver Act50 certainly did appreciate corporate
productive efficiency. But they nevertheless passed the antitrust laws that
in so many ways attacked these highly efficient corporations. If all they
wanted was to encourage the form of industrial organization that was most
efficient, Congress would have praised the trusts, not condemned them in
the legislative debates.

46. A possible exception for a monopoly that acquired its position through superior
efficiency will be discussed infra Part I.B.4.
47. 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (remarks of Sen. Sherman) (“[The bill] does not in the least
affect combinations in aid of production where there is free and fair competition.”); Id. at
2460 (remarks of Sen. Sherman) (“It is sometimes said of these combinations [the
monopolistic trusts] that they reduce prices to the consumer by better methods of production,
but all experience shows that this saving of cost goes to the pockets of the producer . . . .
Experience has shown that they are the most useful agencies of modern civilization. They
have enabled individuals to unite to undertake great enterprises only attempted in former
times by powerful governments. The good results of corporate power are shown in the vast
development of our railroads and the enormous increase of business and production of all
kinds.”).
48. See 51 CONG. REC. 12,146 (1914) (statement of Sen. Hollis) (“Fair competition is
competition which is successful through superior efficiency. Competition is unfair when it
resorts to methods which shut out competitors who, by reason of their efficiency, might
otherwise be able to continue in business and prosper. Without the use of unfair methods no
corporation can grow beyond the limits imposed upon it by the necessity of being as efficient
as any competitor. The mere size of a corporation which maintains its position solely
through superior efficiency is ordinarily no menace to the public interest.”); see also id. at
11,231 (statement of Sen. Robinson) (“Nearly all normal business men can distinguish
between ‘fair competition’ and ‘unfair competition.’ Efficiency is generally regarded as the
fundamental principle of the former—efficiency in producing and in selling; while
oppression or advantage obtained by deception or some questionable means is the
distinguishing characteristic of ‘unfair competition.’” (quoting William H.S. Stevens, a
leading economist of the times)); id. at 8854 (statement of Rep. Morgan) (“To enable us to
secure all the benefits and advantages of the large industrial unit and escape the evils and
dangers thereof . . . . To relieve doubt and uncertainty in business, develop trade, encourage
commerce, and promote enterprise.”). Additional concern for efficiency can be found in the
earliest proceedings of the FTC, which noted its desire in making rulings and orders “to
promote business efficiency and, within the limits of practicability, to cooperate with the
business world in developing the best standards of commercial ethics.” FTC, ANNUAL
REPORT 26 (1916).
49. See, e.g., 51 CONG. REC. 14,223 (remarks of Sen. Thompson) (noting his desire to
protect consumers and to encourage corporate efficiency: “The chief purpose of antitrust
legislation is for the protection of the public, to protect it from extortion practiced by the
trust, but at the same time not to take away from it any advantages of cheapness or better
service which honest, intelligent cooperation may bring”). For other discussions of the
legislative history, see Muris, supra note 2.
50. See Hearings on H.R. 2734 Before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
81st Cong. 61 (1949) (statement of Rep. Celler) (stating that a “main reason for antitrust
laws is that we believe the competitive system is more efficient than monopoly”); see also
Hearings on H.R. 2734 Before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 81st Cong.,
140, 308 (1950) (statement of Sen. Donelly) (expressing concern with the bill’s “effect on
prices, the effect on productive efficiency”).
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On the contrary, the congressional debates51 and committee reports52
show that the antitrust laws primarily were enacted to prevent higher
prices53 and wealth transfers from consumers to firms with market power.54
If Congress primarily had cared about enhancing economic efficiency, it
would have enacted “protrust” laws, not “antitrust” laws.
B. A “Textualist,” “Plain Meaning,” or “Fair Reading” Analysis of the
Antitrust Laws: What Would Justice Scalia Do?
Justice Scalia has long been the chief advocate of a method of
interpreting legislation known as the “textualist,” “fair reading,” or “plain
51. For citations demonstrating this wealth transfer concern in the legislative debates
over the Clayton Act, FTC Act, and Celler-Kefauver Act, see Lande, supra note 14, passim.
To give just one vivid example, during the FTC Act debates Senator Lane identified the
results of the problems as “the fraud and the theft which is being practiced upon the people
of this country . . . which mulct the people of this country out of hundreds of millions of
dollars each year . . . . [The people] are also being compelled to pay arbitrarily fixed and
unjustly high prices for what they consume, they are being robbed.” 51 CONG. REC. 13,223
(statement of Sen. Lane).
52. As an example of this concern, the Minority Report of the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce complained in their discussions of the bill that would
become the FTC Act, that “[t]he common people are staggering under the burden they bear
as a result of contributing extortionate profits to the trusts and monopolies.” H.R. REP. NO.
63-533, pt. 3, at 5 (1914) (minority report) (Rep. Lafferty’s views). Senator Newlands, the
FTC Act’s main sponsor and the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Interstate
Commerce, framed the issue as a concern for “unreasonable and extortionate prices.” See
S. REP. NO. 63-597, at 25 (1914). Newlands also spoke in terms of an “unfair or
unreasonable price.” Id.
53. For examples of this concern in committee reports in the FTC Act deliberations, the
goals of “protecting consumers against too high prices and [guarding] the interests of
employees” were expressed by the House in H.R. REP. NO. 63-533, pt. I, at 4 (quoting from
the Preliminary Report of the Industrial Commission, submitted to Congress in 1900). The
Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce wanted to keep “within limited bounds the
activities of a multitude of price-fixing associations in different branches of business, which,
together with the great trusts, have been potent causes of the present high cost of living.”
S. REP. NO. 63-597, at 9.
54. Since the legislative history is so clear, one might ask how the efficiency orientation
could have gained so much ground. There are three possible, nonexclusive explanations:
1. The election of President Reagan in 1980 put enforcers and judges in power who
were predisposed to accept the efficiency explanation.
2. The only available alternative to the efficiency model during the transition to the
Reagan Administration was the big is bad/small is good, social/political model, which was
correctly perceived by decisionmakers as almost standardless and overly difficult to
administer in a predictable manner. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 13, at 9. By contrast, the
wealth transfer approach is just as easy to administer, and just as predictable, as the
efficiency model. See infra Part II.C. This wealth transfer is model was not, however,
available at the dawn of the Reagan Administration, so it perhaps was natural that the
decision makers instead opted for the model that economists were using—economic
efficiency.
3. Confusion over the term “consumer welfare.” Bork’s extremely influential work
advocated maximizing “consumer welfare,” a seemingly pro-consumer objective. However,
he defined the term so that it included a concern with the welfare of monopolies and cartels;
prices could rise and “consumer welfare” could still increase! His deceptive use of the term
“consumer welfare,” instead of the more honest term “total welfare,” was a brilliant way to
market the efficiency objective.
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meaning” approach.55 He has often been joined in this approach by other
Supreme Court Justices.56
Justice Scalia expressly rejects the use of such traditional legislative
history as the debates in Congress and the reports of congressional
committees.57 He explains: “In any major piece of legislation, the
legislative history is extensive, and there is something for everybody. As
Judge Harold Leventhal used to say, the trick is to look over the heads of
the crowd and pick out your friends. The variety and specificity of result
that legislative history can achieve is unparalleled.”58 He explained further:
55. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 28, at 428, 436, 441; see also SCALIA, supra note
25. Justice Scalia makes an important distinction: “Textualism should not be confused with
so-called strict constructionism, a degraded form of textualism that brings the whole
philosophy into disrepute. I am not a strict constructionist, and no one ought to be—though
better that, I suppose, than a nontextualist. A text should not be construed strictly, and it
should not be construed leniently; it should be construed reasonably, to contain all that it
fairly means.” SCALIA, supra note 25, at 23.
56. For examples, see Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 23, at 220–21, and Tiefer, supra
note 23, at 216–17.
57. Scalia said, “To say that I used legislative history is simply, to put it bluntly, a lie.”
Debra Cassens Weiss, Scalia Weighs In on Posner’s Controversial Book Review, Calls
Posner’s Assertion “a Lie,” ABA JOURNAL (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.abajournal.com/
news/article/scalia_weighs_in_on_a_controversial_book_review [hereinafter “Interview”].
Justice Scalia was responding to an article by Judge Posner. Id. Judge Posner responded as
follows: “[Scalia] may not consider such a historical inquiry to be an exercise of ‘legislative
history,’ because he defines legislative history very narrowly.” Text of Judge Posner’s
Respose [sic] to Justice Scalia, THOMSON REUTERS (Sept. 20, 2012), http://newsand
insight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2012/09_-_September/Text_of_Judge_Posner_s_
respose_to_Justice_Scalia/. Posner also said:
His coauthor, Bryan Garner, does not define it so. Here is the definition of the
term in Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009), of which Garner is the editor:
“The background and events leading to the enactment of a statute, including
hearings, committee reports, and floor debates.” The “background and events
leading to the enactment” of the Second Amendment are the focus of the Heller
opinion.
Id. Posner also said:
[I]n seeking the original eighteenth-century meaning of the text of the Second
Amendment Justice Scalia had been doing legislative history. His quest for
original meaning had taken him to a variety of English and American sources from
which he distilled the existence of a common law right of armed self-defense that
he argued had been codified in the Second Amendment.
Id.
58. SCALIA, supra note 25, at 36. Scalia writes:
[I]t is simply incompatible with democratic government, or indeed, even with fair
government, to have the meaning of a law determined by what the lawgiver meant,
rather than by what the lawgiver promulgated. That seems to me one step worse
than the trick the emperor Nero was said to engage in: posting edicts high up on
the pillars, so that they could not easily be read. Government by unexpressed
intent is similarly tyrannical. It is the law that governs, not the intent of the
lawgiver.
Id. at 17. Further, he quotes Holmes:
“Only a day or two ago—when counsel talked of the intention of a legislature, I
was indiscreet enough to say I don’t care what their intention was. I only want to
know what the words mean.” And I agree with Holmes’s other remark, quoted
approvingly by Justice Jackson: “We do not inquire what the legislature meant;
we ask only what the statute means.”
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Why would you think this [material—the legislative debates and
committee reports—] is an expression of the legislature’s intent? And the
more you use that garbage, the less accurate it is. What—one of . . . the
major—functions of . . . hot shot Washington lawyers is drafting
legislative history. You send it up to the hill, and get a friendly Senator to
read it into the record or something else, to change the meaning of the text
that’s adopted. So, you know, . . . it’s crazy.59

Instead Justice Scalia attempts to ascertain the “plain meaning” of the
text of statutes by making extensive use of material such as roughly
60
contemporaneous dictionaries and legal decisions to define key terms.
Justice Scalia also examines the country’s history at approximately the time
of the legislation and the legislation’s societal context to help define the
particular words or phrases in the statutes. He does this even though it is
contrary to the traditional approach for determining congressional intent:
[A]ny legal audience knows what legislative history is. It’s the history of
the enactment of the bill. It’s the floor speeches. It’s the prior drafts of
committees. That’s what legislative history is. It isn’t the history of the
times. It’s not what people thought it meant immediately after its
enactment.61

1. Justice Scalia Has Not Performed a Textualist Analysis of
the Relevant Antitrust Terms
Unfortunately, Justice Scalia has not performed a textualist analysis of
any of the antitrust laws that address the overall goal or goals of the statutes
or the efficiency/wealth transfer debate. Justice Scalia has authored three
opinions,62 three concurrences,63 and three dissenting64 opinions in antitrust

Id. at 22–23 (footnotes omitted).
59. Newsmaker: Justice Antonin Scalia and Professor Bryan A. Garner, THOMSON
REUTERS (September 17, 2012), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/uploadedFiles/
Reuters_Content/2012/09_-_September/Scalia_Reuters_transcript.pdf [hereinafter “Scalia
Interview”]. Justice Scalia has also written:
It is much more likely to produce a false or contrived legislative intent than a
genuine one. The first and most obvious reason for this is that, with respect to
99.99 percent of the issues of construction reaching the courts, there is no
legislative intent, so that any clues provided by the legislative history are bound to
be false. Those issues almost invariably involve points of relative detail, compared
with the major sweep of the statute in question.
SCALIA, supra note 25, at 32.
60. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 28, at 33, 37. Immediately after Scalia introduces
the “fair reading” method, on page 33, he cites three sources on guides to statutory
interpretation, and then, as examples of permissible and useful sources of meaning, four
contemporary dictionary definitions of key terms. Id. at 33–39.
61. Scalia Interview, supra note 59.
62. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398
(2004); City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991); Bus. Elecs.
Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
63. See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 176 (2004)
(Scalia, J., concurring); FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 640–41 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 576–81 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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cases. Most do not even come close to undertaking a textualist analysis of
the goals of the antitrust laws.65 Nevertheless, some of these opinions are
instructive illustrations of textualist analysis.
For example, in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California,66 Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority in part and dissenting in part, performed a
textualist analysis of the term “boycott,” as it was used in the McCarranFerguson Act exception to the antitrust laws:
Determining proper application of § 3(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act
to the present cases requires precise definition of the word “boycott.” It is
a relatively new word, little more than a century old. It was first used in
1880, to describe the collective action taken against Captain Charles
Boycott, an English agent managing various estates in Ireland . . . . Thus,
the verb made from the unfortunate Captain’s name has had from the
outset the meaning it continues to carry today. To “boycott” means “[t]o
combine in refusing to hold relations of any kind, social or commercial,
public or private, with (a neighbour), on account of political or other
differences, so as to punish him for the position he has taken up, or coerce
him into abandoning it.”67

Justice Scalia then used the above dictionary definition to resolve a key
legal dispute:
Petitioners have suggested that a boycott ordinarily requires “an absolute
refusal to deal on any terms,” which was concededly not the case here
. . . . We think not. As the definition just recited provides, the refusal
may be imposed “to punish [the target] for the position he has taken up, or
coerce him into abandoning it.” The refusal to deal may, in other words,
be conditional, offering its target the incentive of renewed dealing if and
when he mends his ways. This is often the case—and indeed seems to
have been the case with the original Boycott boycott. Furthermore, other

In F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Justice Scalia declined to join the majority in part because of its
extensive use of legislative history:
I concur in the judgment of the Court because the language of the statute is readily
susceptible of the interpretation the Court provides and because only that
interpretation is consistent with the principle that statutes should be read in accord
with the customary deference to the application of foreign countries’ laws within
their own territories.
F. Hoffmann-La Roche¸ 542 U.S. at 176 (Scalia, J., concurring).
64. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 800–22 (1993) (Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Part I and delivered a dissenting opinion
with respect to Part II); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,
486–504 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 333–
43 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
65. See Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. at 370–84; see also F. Hoffmann-La
Roche, 542 U.S. at 176 (Scalia, J., concurring); Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. at 640–41
(Scalia, J., concurring); Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 486–504 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
66. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 800–22 (Scalia, J., writing for the majority in part
and dissenting in part).
67. Id. at 800–01 (footnote omitted) (quoting 2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 468 (2d
ed. 1989)).
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dictionary definitions extend the term to include a partial boycott—a
refusal to engage in some, but not all, transactions with the target.68

This is significant because it illustrates Justice Scalia’s use of roughly
contemporaneous dictionary definitions (he used a 1950 dictionary to define
a term in a 1946 law), a technique that will be discussed below.
The Scalia opinion that would have been most likely to undertake the
relevant textualist analysis was Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko because the case involved the core meaning of
section 2 of the Sherman Act.69 Unfortunately, Justice Scalia’s opinion did
not undertake a textualist analysis of the overall meaning of section 2. He
instead simply cited precedent70 for his assertion that the Sherman Act
contains an exception for a monopolist that gains its monopoly through
historical accident or superior efficiency.71
Justice Scalia extensively analyzed the term “restraint of trade” in
Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp. using a common
law–based textualist analysis, but he was not looking for the ultimate goals
of the Sherman Act.72 Rather, he distinguished the idea of a “restraint of
trade” from the understanding of which specific business practices
restrained trade.73 His opinion considered the common law antecedents of
modern antitrust law, but did not involve the efficiency/transfer issue.74
68. Id. (citations omitted) (citing WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 321 (2d
ed. 1950) (defining “boycott” as “to withhold, wholly or in part, social or business
intercourse from, as an expression of disapproval or means of coercion” (emphasis added)).
69. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398
(2004).
70. Justice Scalia does believe in the use of precedent and stare decisis. See generally
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
71. Verizon Commc’ns Inc., 540 U.S. at 407. Justice Scalia stated:
The complaint alleges that Verizon denied interconnection services to rivals in
order to limit entry. If that allegation states an antitrust claim at all, it does so
under § 2 of the Sherman Act, which declares that a firm shall not “monopolize” or
“attempt to monopolize.” It is settled law that this offense requires, in addition to
the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market, “the willful acquisition
or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71
(1966)).
72. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 731 (1988).
73. Id. Scalia wrote:
In resting our decision upon the foregoing economic analysis, we do not ignore
common-law precedent concerning what constituted “restraint of trade” at the
time the Sherman Act was adopted. But neither do we give that pre-1890
precedent the dispositive effect some would. The term “restraint of trade” in the
statute, like the term at common law, refers not to a particular list of agreements,
but to a particular economic consequence, which may be produced by quite
different sorts of agreements in varying times and circumstances . . . . The
Sherman Act adopted the term “restraint of trade” along with its dynamic
potential. It invokes the common law itself, and not merely the static content that
the common law had assigned to the term in 1890. If it were otherwise, not only
would the line of per se illegality have to be drawn today precisely where it was in
1890, but also case-by-case evaluation of legality (conducted where per se rules do
not apply) would have to be governed by 19th-century notions of reasonableness.
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Finally, although Justice Scalia did not discuss the issue of the ultimate
goals of the antitrust laws, it is instructive that in a concurring opinion in
Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, a Robinson-Patman Act case, he wrote:
The language of the Act is straightforward: Any price discrimination
whose effect “may be substantially . . . to injure, destroy, or prevent
competition” is prohibited, unless it is immunized by the “cost
justification” defense, i.e., unless it “make[s] only due allowance for
differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the
differing methods or quantities in which [the] commodities are . . . sold or
delivered.” There is no exception for “reasonable” functional discounts
that do not meet this requirement.”75

This textualist discussion is noteworthy because it affirms the common
sense idea that no exception should be implied in the law unless it is
explicitly a part of the statute.76
Since Justice Scalia has not performed a plain meaning examination of
the Antitrust laws to decide their goals, this Article will undertake the task
using his methodology.77 This Article will perform a textualist analysis of
the antitrust statutes to help clarify which goal or goals Congress wanted to
be embodied in these laws.
As discussed, if Justice Scalia’s textualist analysis were applied to
antitrust statutes, neither the Congressional debates nor the committee
reports would be analyzed.78 A textualist analysis would, however,
It would make no sense to create out of the single term “restraint of trade” a
chronologically schizoid statute, in which a “rule of reason” evolves with new
circumstances and new wisdom, but a line of per se illegality remains forever fixed
where it was.
Id. at 731–32 (citations omitted).
Justice Scalia also cited, with apparent approval, a pre–Sherman Act common law
case. Id. at 731 (citing Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas Co., 130 U.S. 396, 409 (1889) (noting that
the English case laying down the common-law rule that contracts in restraint of trade are
invalid “was made under a condition of things, and a state of society, different from those
which now prevail, [and therefore] the rule laid down is not regarded as inflexible, and has
been considerably modified”).
74. He wrote:
Of course the common law, both in general and as embodied in the Sherman Act,
does not lightly assume that the economic realities underlying earlier decisions
have changed, or that earlier judicial perceptions of those realities were in error. It
is relevant, therefore, whether the common law of restraint of trade ever prohibited
as illegal per se an agreement of the sort made here, and whether our decisions
under § 1 of the Sherman Act have ever expressed or necessarily implied such a
prohibition.
Id. at 732–33.
75. Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 579 (1990) (alterations in original) (citation
omitted).
76. This will be important in Part I.B.4 during the discussion of whether section 2 of the
Sherman Act actually contains an “exception” for monopolies attained by superior
efficiency.
77. This article does not agree with Justice Scalia that traditional legislative history
should be ignored and a textualist analysis should instead be performed.
78. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 28, at 369 (“The false notion that committee
reports and floor speeches are worthwhile aids in statutory construction.”).
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undertake a number of inquiries to ascertain what the statutes “plainly”
mean. To do this the inquiry would examine:
(1) The definitions of the key terms in dictionaries (Justice Scalia seems
especially interested in the definitions of key words in contemporary
dictionaries79), legal dictionaries, and legal treatises that existed when
these laws were passed. Ideally we would find and analyze sources
defining these terms when the antitrust laws were passed.80
(2) Pre-1890 English common law cases should be examined to determine
whether the federal antitrust statutes borrowed key terms from the
common law and, if so, what they meant in common law decisions.81 It
could even be possible to make inferences from state antitrust statutes—
and their subsequent interpretations by courts—that existed when the
federal antitrust laws were passed, in case the federal laws borrowed key
terms from a state statute.82
(3) Another inquiry would be into how federal antitrust cases from the
1890s used these terms to help determine “what people thought it meant
immediately after its enactment.”83 Did the definitions of these terms in

79. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. Immediately after Scalia & Garner
introduce the “fair reading” method, on page 33, they cite three sources on guides to
statutory interpretation, and then, as examples of permissible and useful sources of meaning,
four dictionary definitions of key terms. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 28, at 37.
80. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 28, at 78 (“Words must be given the meaning they
had when the text was adopted.”); see also id. at 415–24.
81. Id. at 320 (“Cannon of Imputed Common-Law Meaning: A statute that uses a
common-law term, without defining it, adopts its common-law meaning.”); see also id.
(where Justice Scalia cited, with apparent approval, a pre–Sherman Act common law
antitrust case).
82. This surely is the weakest of the aids to interpretation because state statutes could be
inconsistent with one another. In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), Scalia
examined state constitutional provisions and statutes to help determine what various terms in
the Second Amendment meant:
From our review of founding-era sources, we conclude that this natural
meaning was also the meaning that “bear arms” had in the 18th century. In
numerous instances, “bear arms” was unambiguously used to refer to the carrying
of weapons outside of an organized militia. The most prominent examples are
those most relevant to the Second Amendment: Nine state constitutional provisions
written in the 18th century or the first two decades of the 19th, which enshrined a
right of citizens to “bear arms in defense of themselves and the state” or “bear
arms in defense of himself and the state . . . . That was also the interpretation of
those state constitutional provisions adopted by pre–Civil War state courts.
Heller, 554 U.S. at 584–85 (citations omitted). Scalia also was guided by analogous state
statutes:
Many colonial statutes required individual arms-bearing for public-safety
reasons—such as the 1770 Georgia law that “for the security and defence of this
province from internal dangers and insurrections” required those men who
qualified for militia duty individually “to carry fire arms” “to places of public
worship.” That broad public-safety understanding was the connotation given to
the North Carolina right by that State’s Supreme Court in 1843.
Id. at 601 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting 19 COLONIAL RECORDS OF THE
STATE OF GEORGIA 137–39 (A. Candler ed. 1911 (pt. 2)).
83. See supra text accompanying note 60. Justice Scalia noted the first interpretation of
certain constitutional amendments in the first case to consider them, in a context that
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the period just after the laws’ enactments indicate, for example, whether
the transfer effects of market power were meant to count in antitrust
analysis? This is perhaps another way of giving effect to the doctrine of
stare decisis: if a statute was interpreted one way shortly after it was
enacted, that interpretation should be given respect.84
(4) A textualist analysis also would consider the “history of the times.”85
It would attempt to use the history of the period producing the antitrust
suggests this was more likely to be their correct interpretation. SCALIA & GARNER, supra
note 28, at 101–02.
84. In Heller, Justice Scalia used statutory interpretations of the Second Amendment that
were from the period shortly after it was adopted as a guide to determine its meaning. As he
explained:
We now address how the Second Amendment was interpreted from immediately
after its ratification through the end of the 19th century. Before proceeding,
however, we take issue with Justice Stevens’ equating of these sources with
postenactment legislative history, a comparison that betrays a fundamental
misunderstanding of a court’s interpretive task. “Legislative history,” of course,
refers to the pre-enactment statements of those who drafted or voted for a law; it is
considered persuasive by some, not because they reflect the general understanding
of the disputed terms, but because the legislators who heard or read those
statements presumably voted with that understanding. “Postenactment legislative
history,” a deprecatory contradiction in terms, refers to statements of those who
drafted or voted for the law that are made after its enactment and hence could have
had no effect on the congressional vote. It most certainly does not refer to the
examination of a variety of legal and other sources to determine the public
understanding of a legal text in the period after its enactment or ratification. That
sort of inquiry is a critical tool of constitutional interpretation. As we will show,
virtually all interpreters of the Second Amendment in the century after its
enactment interpreted the amendment as we do . . . . The 19th-century cases that
interpreted the Second Amendment universally support an individual right
unconnected to militia service.
Heller, 554 U.S. at 605, 610 (citations omitted). Scalia also analyzed the meaning of “keep
arms” and was guided by interpretations in cases decided shortly after the enactment of the
Second Amendment. Id. at 583 n.7. In other parts of his opinion Justice Scalia also looked
for guidance as to the meanings of critical terms by analyzing postenactment cases from the
era:
This is fully consistent with the ordinary definition of the militia as all able-bodied
men . . . . That is what Congress did in the first militia Act, which specified that
“each and every free able-bodied white male citizen of the respective states,
resident therein, who is or shall be of the age of eighteen years, and under the age
of forty-five years (except as is herein after excepted) shall severally and
respectively be enrolled in the militia.
Id. at 596 (quoting Act of May 8, 1792, 1 Stat. 271) (citation omitted). Further:
Writing for the court in an 1825 libel case, Chief Justice Parker wrote: “The
liberty of the press was to be unrestrained, but he who used it was to be
responsible in cases of its abuse; like the right to keep fire arms, which does not
protect him who uses them for annoyance or destruction.” The analogy makes no
sense if firearms could not be used for any individual purpose at all . . . . Between
1789 and 1820, nine States adopted Second Amendment analogues.
Id. at 602 (quoting Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. 304, 313–14 (1825)) (citations
omitted).
85. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 28, at 399 (“The false notion that lawyers and
judges, not being historians, are unqualified to do the historical research that originalism
requires.”). Scalia and Garner then discuss how the history of gun use in the United States
helps interpret a gun control statute. Id. at 400–02; see also supra note 60. Moreover, Scalia
quotes, with apparent approval, Chief Justice Taney:
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laws to help ascertain what Congress meant when it used terms like
“monopolize” or “restraint of trade” in the Sherman Act.
(5) Finally, a textualist analysis would not imply any exception that is not
plainly evident in the words of the statutes.86 If an antitrust law contains
an explicit exception, then of course that exception would be respected.
But no nonexplicit exceptions would be inferred in order to achieve some
overall goal or purpose of the statute.87

2. Section 1 of the Sherman Act: Concerns with Price and Choice
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “every contract, combination or
conspiracy in restraint of trade.”88 Can the operative term, “in restraint of
trade,” best be characterized in terms of efficiency, of the transfer effects of
market power, or in some other manner?
Could “restraint of trade” be a synonym for conduct that was
productively inefficient? Were the trusts, monopolies, and cartels of the
period condemned because they were so inept at making their products that
their inefficient production “restrained trade”? Was Congress so concerned
with corporate activity that was productively inefficient that it passed the
Sherman Act primarily to help save corporate costs? For example, did
Congress condemn Rockefeller because Standard Oil was so inefficient at
producing oil?89
I am not aware that the trusts existing during the period when the
Sherman Act was passed were ever accused of being inefficient. Although
“In expounding this law, the judgment of the court cannot, in any degree, be
influenced by the construction placed upon it by individual members of Congress
in the debate which took place on its passage, nor by the motives or reasons
assigned by them for supporting or opposing amendments that were offered. The
law as it passed is the will of the majority of both houses, and the only mode in
which that will is spoken is in the act itself: and we must gather their intention
from the language there used, comparing it, when any ambiguity exists, with the
laws upon the same subject, and looking, if necessary, to the public history of the
times in which it was passed.”
SCALIA, supra note 25, at 30 (quoting Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 9, 24 (1845)
(emphasis added)).
86. See supra text accompanying note 78. “Yeah. I mean, that—the law is a law. It’s not
up to the judges to make exceptions to the law because—it seems to me that—compassion—
that’s—that’s not the judge’s job.” Scalia Interview, supra note 58, at 23.
87. Scalia believes no exception should be inferred to achieve a greater purpose because:
[E]ven if you think our laws mean not what the legislature enacted but what the
legislators intended, there is no way to tell what they intended except the text.
Nothing but the text has received the approval of the majority of the legislature and
of the President, assuming that he signed it rather than vetoed it and had it passed
over his veto. Nothing but the text reflects the full legislature’s purpose. Nothing.
Antonin Scalia, & John F. Manning, A Dialogue on Statutory and Constitutional
Interpretation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1610, 1612 (2012).
88. “Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared
to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or
conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
89. Were many people in 1890 in effect saying, “We condemn Rockefeller because he is
so inefficient at producing petroleum products! His inefficiency is harming our country!”?
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many unkind things were said about Rockefeller and Standard Oil, I am not
aware he was ever even accused of inefficiently running his oil company.90
Nor did the Department of Justice, when prosecuting the Standard Oil trust,
ever assert that the company was inefficient or that it should be found to
have violated the Sherman Act because it was inefficient.91
Indeed, the trusts were among the most efficient businesses of their
times.92 They were in large part responsible for price levels that fell, not
rose, both in general and for many specific products that were the subject of
trusts during the period just before the Sherman Act’s passage.93 If
efficiency had been Congress’s overriding concern, it would have enacted a
“protrust law” not an “antitrust law.”
Rather, Congress’s concern for business arrangements that “restrain
trade” can “plainly” equate to a concern with arrangements that “reduce”
trade, as the terms “restrain” and “reduce” are similar. A normal result of
arrangements that reduce trade or output,94 of course, is higher prices.95
In addition, a contract, combination, or conspiracy that “restrains” trade
can distort or change it, rather than simply diminish its size or quantity. In
other words, a “restraint” of trade also could distort the competitive array of
offerings in the market, not just the market’s total output (which would
affect market price). Indeed, the antitrust statutes are not written in terms of
the “price” effects of market power.
The antitrust statutes focus instead on more general principles. Section 1
of the Sherman Act is concerned with arrangements in “restraint of trade,”
not arrangements that “lead to higher prices.” A fair reading of the
Sherman Act suggests that every important element of trade—price, quality,
variety, etc.—was meant to be the concern of the antitrust statutes.96
90. See, e.g., Ida M. Tarbell, The Rise of the Standard Oil Company, MCCLURE’S
MAGAZINE, Dec. 1902, at 115–28. See generally RON CHERNOW, TITAN: THE LIFE OF JOHN
D. ROCKEFELLER, SR. (1998).
91. For an excellent and thorough analysis of the Standard Oil case, see James May, The
Story of Standard Oil Co. v. United States, in ANTITRUST STORIES 7 (Eleanor M. Fox &
Daniel A. Crane eds., 2007). Professor May analyzed, inter alia, over 1,800 pages of briefs
filed by both parties and informed the author of this Article that he never found an
accusation by the Department of Justice that Standard Oil was inefficient, or an attempt by
the government to condemn the company for being inefficient. Id.
92. See Lande, supra note 14, at 90–93.
93. Id. at 97–99.
94. Some conduct, such as price discrimination, might “restrain trade” even if it does not
increase prices. Price discrimination can change the terms and conditions of trade, but not
reduce overall output. See Robert H. Lande, Should Predatory Pricing Rules Immunize
Exclusionary Discounts?, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 863, 880 (2006), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1121473. In addition, firms might fix prices at levels
they claim are reasonable. Since the prices were fixed, however, trade would be restrained
even if the prices were set at a reasonable level. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United
States, 175 U.S. 211, 234–37 (1899).
95. See, e.g., Williamson, supra note 2, at 33. Reduced output and higher prices are
almost identical concepts. Price discrimination is an exception, as shown in Lande, supra
note 94, at 867–68.
96. As John Forrest Dillon noted in his 1890 treatise, JOHN FORREST DILLON,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 430 n.3 (4th ed. 1890): “A
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A concern with practices that raise prices also was suggested in an 1880
common law “restraint of trade” case, Skrainka v. Scharringhausen.97 The
case was concerned with the price effects of market power98 and, more
specifically, with the transfer effects of higher prices: “So, an association
among all the proprietors of boats on the great canals of New York and
Pennsylvania to keep up the price of freight and divide the profits has been
held void.”99
A price concern also was suggested in two of the earliest Sherman Act
cases. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States100 held that the higher
price would operate as a direct restraint upon the trade, and therefore any
contract or combination that enhanced the price might in some degree
restrain the trade in the article.101
United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass’n similarly held:
The natural and direct effect of the two agreements is the same, viz. to
maintain rates at a higher level than would otherwise prevail . . . . The
natural, direct, and immediate effect of competition is, however, to lower
rates, and to thereby increase the demand for commodities, the supplying
of which increases commerce; and an agreement whose first and direct
effect is to prevent this play of competition restrains, instead of
promoting, trade and commerce.102

monopoly exists when the sale of any merchandise or commodity is restrained to one or to a
certain number; and it has three inseparable consequents—the increase of the price, the
badness of the wares, the impoverishment of others.” Id. (citation omitted). The 1601
common law case, the Case of Monopolies, similarly held: “The 2d (c) incident to a
monopoly is, that after the monopoly granted, the commodity is not so good and
merchantable as it was before . . . .” Darcy v. Allein [The Case of Monopolies], [1601] 77
Eng Rep. 1260. Normally antitrust can simply focus upon prices, an approach that prevents
transfers of wealth from consumers to firms with market power, even though non-price
competition is often crucial to consumer welfare. This is because normally a market that is
price competitive also will produce optimal non-price competition. But this is not always
true. See supra Part III.B.
97. 8 Mo. App. 522, 523 (1880).
98. Id. at 526. (“[T]he essential question is one of monopoly and of injury to the public.
Where the grain-dealers of a whole town formed a secret combination to stifle all
competition, and thus to control and keep up the price of grain: that was held void.”).
99. Id. However, the restraints in question only covered part of the market, so
presumably the firms lacked market power and the restraints therefore should not be
condemned under either a total welfare or a consumer welfare approach:
The partial nature of the restraint in the case before us seems to be not colorable,
but real. The agreement is amongst the quarrymen of one district of one city, and
it does not appear that it embraces all of them. There is no evidence that it works
any public mischief, and the contract is not of such a nature that it is apparent from
its terms that it tends to deprive men of employment, unduly raise prices, cause a
monopoly, or put an end to competition. It is limited both as to time and place;
and we know of no case in recent times in which a contract such as the one before
us has been declared illegal.
Id. at 527.
100. 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
101. Id. at 241.
102. 171 U.S. 505, 565, 577 (1898).
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Of course, supracompetitive pricing leads to both allocative inefficiency
and wealth transfers from consumers to firms with market power.103 Thus,
if we equate “restrain trade” with a concern with higher prices, this does not
help determine whether the statute embodies an allocative inefficiency
concern, a wealth transfer concern, or both.
Nevertheless, in most cases a price standard will be identical to a wealth
transfer concern.104 Neither would, for example, permit a merger to a
monopoly or a cartel that raised prices, even if permitting this would be net
efficient. An efficiency standard, by contrast, would permit mergers, joint
ventures, and cartels leading to higher prices so long as the arrangement
was net efficient.105 For this reason a “plain meaning” of section 1 of the
Sherman Act would decide the first two hypotheticals in this Article the
same way as the wealth transfer (stealing) approach. Neither hypothetical,
however, would be decided the correct way under an efficiency approach.
A price concern is, moreover, consistent with the definitions of “restraint
of trade” used in a contemporaneous legal treatise:
§ 125. What constitutes restraint of trade. It certainly is not true that
every contract which reduces competition or that restrains trade is illegal;
. . . The natural result of the sale of a railroad to a rival line destroys
competition and generally restrains, that is, lessens traffic by increasing
rates. And the same could be said in every case where a merchant buys
out his rivals and secures a monopoly in a town.106

Another source did not use the exact phrase “restraint of trade,” but it did
employ two close terms: “Agreements tending to monopoly—i.e., ‘any
combination among merchants to raise the price of merchandise, to the
detriment of the public,’ are illegal.”107

103. See, e.g., Williamson, supra note 2, at fig.1.
104. The price and wealth transfer standards are identical except when firms are able to
practice certain forms of price discrimination. See Lande, supra note 94, at 884.
105. See, e.g., Williamson, supra note 2, at 18–19.
106. See 1 THOMAS CARL SPELLING, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
144 (1892). The treatise adds: “There is substantial harmony between the English and
American definitions of monopoly, the two countries agreeing that contracts entered into by
and between two or more corporations, the necessary result of whose performance will crush
and destroy competition, are illegal.” Id.; see also United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S.
1 (1895) (“It was further averred that the American Sugar Refining Company monopolized
the manufacture and sale of refined sugar in the United States, and controlled the price of
sugar; that in making the contracts, Searles and the American Sugar Refining Company
combined and conspired with the other defendants to restrain trade and commerce in refined
sugar among the several states and foreign nations, and that the said contracts were made
with the intent to enable the American Sugar Refining Company to restrain the sale of
refined sugar in Pennsylvania and among the several states, and to increase the regular price
at which refined sugar was sold, and thereby to exact and secure large sums of money from
the state of Pennsylvania, and from the other states of the United States, and from all other
purchasers; and that the same was unlawful, and contrary to the said act.”).
107. CHARLES FISK BEACH, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 112
n.1 (1891).
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For a similar concern with price in one of the earliest Sherman Act cases,
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, the defendants were charged
with unjustly raising prices.108 The case held:
[T]he action of this corporation in establishing the rates to be charged
largely influences the net profit coming to the farmer, the manufacturer,
and the merchant, from the sale of the products of the farm, the workshop
and manufactory, and of the merchandise purchased and resold, and also
largely influences the price to be paid by everyone who consumes any of
the property transported over the line of railway.109

This 1897 case is especially significant because, in addition to a price
concern, it recognizes and manifests concern with the transfer effects of
market power (i.e., it condemns prices that “exact and procure great sums of
money from the people” and is concerned with the “net profit coming to the
farmer”).110 But it is not concerned with market power’s allocative
inefficiency effects.
In summary, section 1 of the Sherman Act’s prohibition against
contracts, combinations, or conspiracies “in restraint of trade” was not
directed at business arrangements that are inefficient. Rather, a “restraint of
trade” usually means a practice that restricts output and therefore raises
prices. When on-price competition is important, it means a practice that
distorts some non-price aspect of consumer choice. This plain reading of
the term “restraint of trade” has been reinforced by an analysis of both some
of the earliest antitrust cases and also contemporary legal treatises.
3. Section 2 of the Sherman Act: A Concern that Supracompetitive Pricing
Steals from Consumers
Section 2 of the Sherman Act holds: “Every person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize . . . shall be deemed guilty.”111 A
search of contemporary sources for the key section 2 term, “monopolize”
and the related term, “monopoly” found several definitions relevant to the
efficiency/wealth transfer debate. “A monopoly exists when the sale of any
merchandise or commodity is restrained to one or to a certain number; and
it has three inseparable consequents, the increase of the price, the badness
of the wares, the impoverishment of others.”112
Even though this treatise spoke of a “monopoly” rather than the verb “to
monopolize,” it shows that in 1890 the wealth transfer effects of
monopolies were well understood. A contemporaneous treatise was even
more explicitly focused on the transfer effects of market power and defined
the word “monopolize” as follows:
108. 166 U.S. 290, 292 (1897).
109. Id. at 336.
110. Id. at 299, 336.
111. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize . . .
shall be deemed guilty . . . .”).
112. DILLON, supra note 96, at 430 n.3 (citation omitted).
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In whatever there is opportunity for competition on equal terms, as in
trading, insurance, banking and the like, there can be no valid objection to
an unlimited number of corporations; but where the necessities of the
public or geographical conformation have provided vantage points as in
the business of transportation, furnishing light and water to cities and
districts, and in certain manufactures the number which can operate
within a given territory successfully is often restricted to one, and
monopoly with the opportunity for oppression, extortion and
accumulation of colossal wealth is a necessary consequence.113

This source thus appeared to use “monopoly” and “monopolize”
interchangeably. By contrast, none of the nineteenth century sources
seemed to be concerned with—or even aware of—the fact that monopoly
pricing leads to allocative inefficiency.
The conclusion that the wealth transfer effects of market power were a
concern is reinforced by a plain reading analysis of pre-1890 state antitrust
statutes. Although many pre-1890 state antitrust statutes do not help clarify
the issues, the preamble to the Florida law against monopolization114
implies that the state’s General Assembly knew about monopolization’s
transfer effects, but not its allocative inefficiency effects: “An act to
prevent during the existing war Monopolies, Extortions and Speculations in
Bread-stuffs and other articles of general use and consumption, and to make
such acts criminal, and to provide penalties for the same.”115 The use of the
word “extortion” implies a concern over the transfer of wealth, not
economic inefficiency. This session law is similar in scope to an 1861 act
of the General Assembly of Georgia which predates the Florida statute and
could have served as its model.116 The Georgia statute further expanded on
the extortion articulation stating that:
Be it further enacted, That any person or persons who shall exact,
demand, or receive exorbitant, unjust, or unreasonable prices for any of
the articles enumerated in the foregoing sections of this Act, shall be
guilty of the crime of extortion; and upon conviction thereof, shall be
punished by fine or imprisonment, or both, in the discretion of the Court;

113. SPELLING, supra note 106, at 20 (emphasis added).
114. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 28, at 217 (“A preamble, purpose clause, or
recital is a permissible indicator of meaning.”). Further, the provision contained in section
two of “The Acts and Resolutions” of the General Assembly of Florida stated that:
Be it further enacted, That all and every person or persons who shall monopolize
any of the articles above mentioned, with intent to produce a scarcity of such
article or articles in the market, or of raising the price or prices of such articles, or
either of them, or if any person or persons shall purchase, procure, or receive any
of the articles specified in the preceding section and hold the same for the purpose
of engrossing the market and raising the price of such article or articles, such
persons or persons so offending shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon
conviction thereof shall be fined in a sum not less than five hundred dollars, nor
exceeding five thousand dollars.
Act of Nov. 17, 1862, ch. 1360, § 2, 1862 Fla. Laws 36, 36.
115. Id.
116. See Act of Dec. 20, 1861, Pub. L. No. 62, § 2, 1861 Ga. Laws 66, 67.
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the fine not to exceed one thousand dollars, and the imprisonment not to
exceed six months.117

The law’s references to “exorbitant, unjust, or unreasonable prices”
verifies that in 1890 people understood and objected to what we today call
the wealth transfer concern. But this language has nothing to do with
allocative inefficiency.
This same theme emerged in pre–Sherman Act common law antitrust
cases. The 1601 case, Darcy v. Allein (The Case of Monopolies)118 noted
the wealth transfer effects of monopolies in several ways:
The sole trade of any . . . monopoly, is not only a damage and prejudice to
those who exercise the same trade, but also to all other subjects, for the
end of all these monopolies is for the private gain of the patentees . . .
there are three inseparable incidents to every monopoly against the
commonwealth, sc. 1. That (e) the price of the same commodity will be
raised . . . .119

Further:
The 2d (c) incident to a monopoly is, that after the monopoly granted, the
commodity is not so good and merchantable as it was before: for the
patentee having the sole trade, regards only his private benefit, and not
the common wealth. 3. It (d) tends to the impoverishment of divers
artificers and others . . . who now will of necessity be constrained to live
in idleness and beggary . . . .120

This passage contains four references to the transfer effects of
monopolies and one to non-price effects. Similarly, in the 1844 common
law case of Evans v. Harlow,121 the defendant was charged with the offense
of “monopolizing high prices at the expense of the public, by stating a
falsehood.”122 The court recognized the wealth transfer effects of
monopoly pricing by finding that the defendant that stated “that he [was]
the sole inventor, manufacturer and patentee, thereby monopoliz[ed] high
prices at the expense of the public.”123
Similarly, The King v. Waddington,124 a common law case from 1800,
also demonstrated judicial distaste for the transfer effects of monopolistic
practices. The case involved “[s]preading rumours with intent to [e]nhance
the price of hops.”125 The court determined that it was a crime to: “by
undue means to enhance [the price] . . . that which the common law of the
land has ordained for the protection of the poor, in preventing the
advancing of the price of those commodities without which they cannot
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Darcy v. Allein (The Case of the Monopolies), [1601] 77 Eng. Rep. 1260.
Id. at 1263 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
[1844] 114 Eng. Rep. 1384.
Id. at 1386.
Id. at 1385 (emphasis added).
[1800] 102 Eng. Rep. 56.
Id. at 56.
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exist.”126 The court focused its opinion on the importance of freedom of
trade and that these laws have the goal of “protecting the poor man against
the avarice of the rich”127 and maintained that the law is necessary “[f]or
the sake of the public, and especially of the poorer part of His Majesty’s
subjects.”128 As a result, the common law was intended to remove “a
temptation to rich men to speculate upon the price of the necessaries of life
at the risk and expence of the poor.”129
The same wealth transfer idea arose in the earliest Sherman Act Supreme
Court cases. The very first Sherman Act case to reach the Court, United
States v. E.C. Knight Co.,130 made this point. The majority opinion held
that “when [a corporation] becomes a practical monopoly, to which the
citizen is compelled to resort, and by means of which a tribute can be
exacted from the community, []is subject to regulation by state legislative
power.”131 The complaint over the transfer effects of market power also
found its voice in Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion:
The influence of a lack of supply or a rise in the price of an article of such
prime necessity cannot be measured. It permeates the entire mass of
community, and leaves few of its members untouched by its withering
blight . . . . “I take it,” said Gibson, J., “a combination is criminal
whenever the act to be done has a necessary tendency to prejudice the
public or to oppress individuals, by unjustly subjecting them to the power
of the confederates, and giving effect to the purpose of the latter, whether
of extortion or of mischief.”132

The court further held, “Those interested in its operations will be satisfied
with nothing less than to have the whole population of America pay tribute
to them.”133
In summary, evidence from contemporary legal treatises, pre-1890 State
antitrust statutes, English common law cases, and some of the earliest
Sherman Act cases all demonstrate that section 2 was concerned with the
wealth transfer effects of monopoly power. But there is no evidence of
even an awareness that monopolies could be inefficient or that monopoly
pricing could lead to allocative inefficiency.
4. Section 2 of the Sherman Act: A No-Fault Monopoly Statute
A textualist analysis of section 2 of the Sherman Act leads to a startling
result. Under a textualist approach, section 2 should be interpreted to
prohibit all monopolies, not just monopolies acquired by anticompetitive
126. Id. at 64 (emphasis added).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 65.
130. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
131. See id. at 11 (emphasis added).
132. Id. at 26–27 (emphasis added).
133. Id. at 43 (emphasis added). Similarly, a district court in an 1891 case, American
Biscuit & Manuf’g Co. v. Klotz, similarly complained about “the prices [that] would be in
danger of being arbitrarily and exorbitantly fixed.” 44 F. 721, 725 (E.D. La. 1891).
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conduct.134 The Sherman Act should not contain an exception for efficient
monopolists or firms that achieved their monopoly by historical accident.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits anyone who shall “monopolize,
or attempt to monopolize.”135 The statute never defines “monopolize” and
uses it in place of the more straightforward term “monopoly.” It is difficult
to know whether “monopolize” was intended to mean the same as
“monopoly,” was meant to be a broader or narrower term, or simply has a
different meaning.
The statute’s prohibition against firms that
“monopolize” could have been meant to encompass only the subset of
conduct that creates a monopoly through anticompetitive means (the current
legal requirement for a section 2 violation).136 However, a “plain meaning”
textualist approach leads to a broader meaning:
a firm illegally
“monopolizes” if it was either a monopoly at the time of the suit, or if it was
in the process of acquiring a monopoly. The statute contains no exception
for a monopoly acquired through superior efficiency.
During the Sherman Act’s legislative debates, just before the final vote,
Senator Edmunds defined the term “monopolize.” Although normally a
textualist approach would not care about anything uttered during a
Congressional debate, Senator Edmund’s remarks should be significant
even to a textualist because he said that Congress should employ in the
Sherman Act the meaning of “monopolize” in a well-known contemporary
dictionary:
I have only to say . . . that this subject was not lightly considered in the
committee, and that we studied it with whatever little ability we had, and
the best answer I can make to both my friends is to read from Webster’s
Dictionary the definition of the verb ‘to monopolize’: 1. To purchase or
obtain possession of the whole of, as a commodity or goods in market,
with the view to appropriate or control the exclusive sale of; as, to
monopolize sugar or tea . . . . 2. To engross or obtain by any means the
exclusive right of, especially the right of trading to any place, or with any
country or district . . . .137

134. The author of this article is not advocating a no-fault approach to monopoly. This is,
however, the logical result of a textualist analysis.
135. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
136. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966).
137. 21 CONG. REC. 3153 (1890). This is part of an exchange that took place at the very
end of the Sherman Act debates. Although the following would not interest a textualist
because it is a legislative debate, it would interest a traditionalist because it constitutes the
only known references in the debates to the issue of whether all monopolies should be found
to be in violation of the statute. Senator Kenna asked:
Is it intended by the committee, as the section seems to indicate, that if an
individual . . . by his own skill and energy, by the propriety of his conduct
generally, shall pursue his calling in such a way as to monopolize a trade, his
action shall be a crime under this proposed act?
He continued:
Suppose a citizen of Kentucky is dealing in shorthorn cattle and by virtue of his
superior skill in that particular product it turns out that he is the only one in the
United States to whom an order comes from Mexico for cattle of that stock for a
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considerable period, so that he is conceded to have a monopoly of that trade with
Mexico; is it intended by the committee that the bill shall make that man a culprit?
Id. at 3151.
Senator Edmunds gave a direct response to Senator Kenna’s hypothetical:
[I]n the case stated the gentleman has not any monopoly at all . . . he has not got
the possession of all the horned cattle in the United States. He has not done
anything but compete with his adversaries in trade, if he had any, to furnish the
commodity for the lowest price. So I assure my friend he need not be disturbed
upon that subject.
Id. at 3151–52.
Senator Edmund’s response indicates that he believed that no
monopolization was involved in the hypothetical, so he did not really consider the need for
an exception for a firm that achieved its monopoly solely by superior skill.
Senator Hoar then gave his answer:
[I]n the case put by [Senator Kenna, if] . . . a man who merely by superior skill and
intelligence, a breeder of horses or raiser of cattle, or manufacturer or artisan of
any kind, got the whole business because nobody could do it as well as he could
was not a monopolist, [unless] it involved something like the use . . . [of unfair]
competition like the engrossing, the buying up of all other persons engaged in the
same business.
Id. at 3152.
Senator Edmunds then provided the final answer to Senator Kenna’s question:
I have only to say . . . that this subject was not lightly considered in the committee,
and that we studied it with whatever little ability we had, and the best answer I can
make to both my friends is to read from Webster’s Dictionary the definition of the
verb ‘to monopolize’: 1. To purchase or obtain possession of the whole of, as a
commodity or goods in market, with the view to appropriate or control the
exclusive sale of; as, to monopolize sugar or tea. Like the sugar trust. One man, if
he had capital enough, could do it just as well as two. 2. To engross or obtain by
any means the exclusive right of, especially the right of trading to any place, or
with any country or district; as, to monopolize the India or Levant trade . . . . [W]e
were not blind to the very suggestions which have been made, and we thought we
had done the right thing in providing, in the very phrase we did, that if one person
instead of two, by a combination, of one person alone, as we have heard about the
wheat market in Chicago, for instance, did it, it was just as offensive and injurious
to the public interest as if two had combined to do it.
Id.
The Sherman Act, forbidding any person to “monopolize” or “attempt to
monopolize” was then passed by the Senate. Id. at 3153.
This crucial segment of the debate deserves careful consideration. Senators Hoar
and Edmunds provided opposite answers to Senator Kenna’s question. Senator Hoar clearly
did not consider a firm to be guilty of “monopolization” if it “got the whole business” by
skill and efficiency alone. Senator Edmunds, however, defined “to monopolize” as merely
“[t]o engross or obtain by any means.” Edmunds intended that “if one person . . . did it, it
was just as offensive and injurious to the public interest as if two had combined to do it.”
Edmunds clearly condemned every monopoly, although by his first response he did not
consider the hypothetical situation given to describe a monopoly. Thus, it would appear that
these statement should be construed as offsetting one another, although, if a judgment had to
be made, since Senator Edmunds spoke last and was one of the main sponsors of the bill, his
statements could perhaps be said to carry greater weight. The fact that this discussion took
place at the very end of the Sherman Act debate also could very well mean that it embodied
Congress’s final view on the subject. However, these statements were also less able to be
corrected or opposed by Senator Sherman or other legislators.
It should be emphasized, however, that this exchange in this footnote would not be
of interest to a textualist because it consists of legislative debate.
Nevertheless, if the main thrust of the statute is kept in mind, including Congress’s
basic condemnation of monopoly pricing despite a potential sacrifice of efficiency, the
Sherman Act does not appear to provide an exception for an efficient monopolist.
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This shows that “monopolize” simply meant to acquire a monopoly. The
definition was not restricted to acquisitions through anticompetitive
conduct.
Moreover, as Justice Scalia reminds us in Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, no
exception should be read into a statute unless it is explicitly contained in the
statute.138 Indeed a pre–Sherman Act Webster’s Dictionary139 contains a
definition of “Monopolize” that is virtually identical to the dictionary
definition read on the Senate floor by Senator Edmund:
1. To purchase or obtain possession of the whole of any commodity or
goods in the market with the view of selling them at advanced prices, and
of having the power of commanding the prices; as, to monopolize sugar or
tea.
2. To engross or obtain by any means the exclusive right of trading to any
place, and the sole power of vending any commodity or goods in a
particular place or country; as, to monopolize the India or Levant trade.
3. To obtain the whole; as, to monopolize advantages.140

This is virtually the same as the definition of monopolize in another
contemporary source, a legal treatise from 1889:
To monopolize, as defined by Webster, is, 1. To purchase or obtain
possession of the whole of any commodity or goods in the market, with
the view of selling them at advanced prices, and having the power to
command the prices. 2. To engross or obtain by any means the exclusive
right of trading to any place, and the sole power of vending any
commodity or goods in a particular place or country.141

These definitions of “monopolize” include all monopolies, even those
acquired through superior efficiency. Like the text of section 2, they
contain no exceptions. Thus, a textualist analysis of section 2 of the
Sherman Act shows that any firm that gains a monopoly commits the
offense of “monopolization,” and there should be no exception for a firm
that acquires its monopoly by efficient methods. Today’s prevailing legal
standard142 is simply inconsistent with a textualist or plain meaning reading
of the statute: the Sherman Act condemns all monopolies.
Indeed, the earliest Sherman Act cases used the terms “monopolize” and
“monopoly” interchangeably. For example, E.C. Knight Co. was concerned
with “monopoly” despite the statutory language of “monopolize”:
[Held], that the result of the transaction complained of was the creation of
a monopoly in the manufacture of a necessary of life . . . “to protect trade
and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies,” . . . . “The

138. See Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 579 (1940).
139. See 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1828).
140. Id. at 727.
141. SANFORD MOON GREEN, CRIME: NATURE, CAUSES, TREATMENT, AND PREVENTS 308
(1889) (emphasis omitted).
142. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966).
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fundamental question is whether, conceding that the existence of a
monopoly in manufacture is established by the evidence, that monopoly
can be directly suppressed under the act of Congress in the mode
attempted by this bill. . . . [I]n other words, when it becomes a practical
monopoly, to which the citizen is compelled to resort and by means of
which a tribute can be exacted from the community,—is subject to
regulation by state legislative power.143

Similarly, an 1891 district court case, American Biscuit & Manuf’g Co. v.
Klotz,144 held:
[T]he law-maker has used the word [monopolize] to mean “to aggregate”
or “concentrate” in the hands of few, practically, and, as a matter of fact,
and according to the known results of human action, to the exclusion of
others . . . . Now it is to be observed that these statutes outline an offense,
but require for its complete commission no ulterior motive, such as to
defraud, etc . . . .145

This court thus appeared to expressly reject the need for anticompetitive
conduct. The opinion continued:
The offense is defined to “combine in the form of trust, or otherwise, in
restraint of trade or commerce,” and “to monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, any of the trade or commerce.” To compass either of these
things, with no other motive than to compass them, and by any means,
constitutes the offense.146

The terms “monopolize” and “monopoly” were thus used
interchangeably, with no exception for an efficiently acquired monopoly or
a monopoly acquired by historical accident. As the Court noted in the 1897
case, United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, no exceptions to the
antitrust statutes should be implied:
In other words, we are asked to read into the act, by way of judicial
legislation, an exception that is not placed there by the lawmaking branch
of the Government, and this is to be done upon the theory that the
impolicy of such legislation is so clear that it cannot be supposed
Congress intended the natural import of the language it used. This we
cannot and ought not to do . . . . These considerations are, however, not
for us. If the act ought to read as contended for by defendants, Congress
is the body to amend it and not this Court, by a process of judicial
legislation wholly unjustifiable.147

As noted earlier, when Justice Scalia authored the opinion in Trinko he
did not undertake a textualist analysis of section 2.148 He simply cited
143. Id. at 6, 10–11.
144. 44 F. 721 (C.C.E.D. La. 1891).
145. Id. at 724–25.
146. Id. at 725.
147. United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 340 (1897). The Court also
held that “no exception or limitation can be added without placing in the act that which has
been omitted by Congress.” Id. at 328.
148. See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko LLP, 540 U.S. 398
(2004).
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precedent for his assertion that the Sherman Act contains an exception for a
monopolist that gained its monopoly through superior efficiency.149 Justice
Scalia has written that he does respect precedent and stare decisis, and this
could explain his approach to the issues in Trinko.150
Nevertheless, the pro-monopoly tone of Scalia’s language in Trinko went
much further than that of any other Supreme Court monopolization opinion.
Until Trinko, the prevailing standard was merely the 1966 Grinnell
requirement of “the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior
product, business acumen, or historic accident.”151 This approach does not
come close to the extensive stridently pro-monopoly language of Trinko.152
Moreover, before United States v. Grinnell Corp.,153 the approach from
United States v. Alcoa prevailed;154 the Alcoa opinion, although opaque and
extremely difficult to understand, is best interpreted as a no-fault monopoly
standard—all monopolies are illegal.155
Elsewhere, Justice Scalia has denounced the type of expansion of
precedent he undertook in Trinko.156 Moreover, in the recent Leegin
Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. decision,157 Justice Scalia
voted to overturn precedent from 1911 that the Supreme Court in two
decisions (opinions that Justice Scalia joined!) had reconsidered but
ultimately declined to overturn.158 In his dissenting opinion in Leegin,
149. Scalia wrote: “It is settled law that this offense requires, in addition to the
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market, ‘the willful acquisition or
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of
a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.’” Id. at 407 (quoting United States
v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966)).
150. See supra note 84.
151. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 570–71.
152. Compare the Grinnell language, in note 136 supra, with Scalia’s language in Trinko:
The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of
monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the freemarket system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least for a short
period—is what attracts “business acumen” in the first place; it induces risk taking
that produces innovation and economic growth. To safeguard the incentive to
innovate, the possession of monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is
accompanied by an element of anticompetitive conduct.
Firms may acquire monopoly power by establishing an infrastructure that
renders them uniquely suited to serve their customers. Compelling such firms to
share the source of their advantage is in some tension with the underlying purpose
of antitrust law, since it may lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or
both to invest in those economically beneficial facilities. Enforced sharing also
requires antitrust courts to act as central planners, identifying the proper price,
quantity, and other terms of dealing—a role for which they are ill suited.
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407–08.
153. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
154. See 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
155. See id.
156. See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1369 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(decrying “sub silentio expansion” of substantive precedent).
157. 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
158. See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988); Monsanto Co.
v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
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much of Justice Breyer’s focus was on how the 1911 precedent should be
upheld on the basis of stare decisis.159 It is this precedent that Justice Scalia
ignored when he joined Justice Kennedy’s opinion, perhaps because
adherence to stare decisis did not yield Scalia’s preferred approach to
antitrust law.
Why did Justice Scalia avoid undertaking a textualist analysis in Trinko,
but instead used the opportunity to move the law of monopolization even
further away from the result that a textualist analysis of this issue would
have produced? Could the explanation be that a textualist interpretation
would have led to a result—no exception for monopolists that gained their
monopoly without undertaking anticompetitive conduct—contrary to his
policy preferences?
5. Section 7 of the Clayton Act
The core of section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers the effect of
which “may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a
monopoly.”160 A textualist or “plain meaning” analysis of section 7
straightforwardly leads to the conclusion that if a merger “may be
substantially”161 likely to lead to a monopoly, or to “tend to lessen

159. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 918 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer states:
We write, not on a blank slate, but on a slate that begins with Dr. Miles and goes
on to list a century’s worth of similar cases, massive amounts of advice that
lawyers have provided their clients, and untold numbers of business decisions
those clients have taken in reliance upon that advice . . . . Those who wish this
Court to change so well-established a legal precedent bear a heavy burden of
proof. I am not aware of any case in which this Court has overturned so wellestablished a statutory precedent.
Id. (citations omitted).
With the preceding discussion in mind, I would consult the list of factors that our
case law indicates are relevant when we consider overruling an earlier case.
Justice Scalia, writing separately in another of our cases this Term, well
summarizes that law. And every relevant factor he mentions argues against
overruling Dr. Miles here.
Id. at 923 (citations omitted).
In sum, every stare decisis concern this Court has ever mentioned counsels against
overruling here. It is difficult for me to understand how one can believe both that
(1) satisfying a set of stare decisis concerns justifies overruling a recent
constitutional decision, Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., (Scalia, J., joined by
Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), but
(2) failing to satisfy any of those same concerns nonetheless permits overruling a
longstanding statutory decision. Either those concerns are relevant or they are not
. . . . All ordinary stare decisis considerations indicate the contrary. For these
reasons, with respect, I dissent.
Id. at 929 (citation omitted).
160. See Clayton Act of 1914 § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006).
161. The “may be substantially” language gives rise to the merger incipiency doctrine.
For an explanation of this doctrine, see Robert H. Lande, Resurrecting Incipiency: From
Von’s Grocery to Consumer Choice, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 875 (2001), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1134815.
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competition,”162 the merger should be blocked. The statute contains no
exception for a merger likely to create an efficient monopoly, so none
should be read into section 7. Just as section 2 of the Sherman Act contains
no exception for a firm that efficiently “monopolizes,” section 7 of the
Clayton Act contains no exception for a merger that produces an efficient
“monopoly.” Nor should an exception be implied for the second part of the
statute: if competition is likely to be impaired enough that prices are likely
to rise, the merger should be prohibited.
As Professor Williamson first demonstrated, it certainly is possible that a
merger could lead to a monopoly that would raise prices, yet be net
efficient.163 Professor Williamson analyzed horizontal mergers using an
approach that balanced efficiencies and showed how mergers might lead
simultaneously to higher prices and also to cost savings. He showed how
the allocative inefficiency caused by merger’s supracompetitive pricing
might well be more than offset by cost savings caused by the merger.164
Under an efficiency approach, these mergers should be permitted even
though both the cost savings and the transfer resulting from the higher
prices would accrue to the monopolist. As the following diagram
illustrates:
Figure 1: Standard Monopoly Power Diagram

An efficiency approach would compare the allocative inefficiency
triangle, A1, with the productive efficiency gain (cost savings), the lower
left rectangle A2. The merger should be blocked only if the triangle is larger
than the rectangle, because only these mergers are net inefficient. Under a
wealth transfer approach, however, any merger likely to lead to higher
prices to consumers should be blocked. This means that if the postmerger
firm “may be substantially” likely to raise prices and therefore to give rise
to the existence of the upper rectangle, W (the wealth transfer effect of
162. The “tend to create a monopoly” language also gives rise to the merger incipiency
doctrine. Id. at 876.
163. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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market power), the merger should be blocked. With only those few
exceptions when non-price considerations would be crucial, 165 an approach
that prevented these wealth transfers would be identical to a “price”
approach.
A “plain meaning” approach should essentially equate “may be
substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly” with a
reasonable probability166 of higher prices to consumers. The same result
would arise if we focused on either the “may be substantially to lessen
competition” or the “tend to create a monopoly” part of the statute. “Lessen
competition” is the same as or similar to a concern with supracompetitive
prices. “Tend to create a monopoly” also gives rise to the same concern.
For either half of the statute, a textualist or plain meaning analysis would
mean that any merger likely to lead to higher prices should be blocked
without exception. A textualist analysis of the Clayton Act would lead to a
price standard with no exception for an efficient monopolist created by
merger under either of this statute’s two tests.
Indeed, this plain meaning of the statute is consistent with the definitions
contained in a roughly contemporaneous source: “Agreements tending to
monopoly—i.e., ‘any combination among merchants to raise the price of
merchandise, to the detriment of the public,’ are illegal.”167
The only way the antimerger statutes could be read to permit a net
efficient merger to monopoly would be a procrustean argument: terms like
“lessen competition” and “tend to create a monopoly” are almost infinitely
malleable terms of art that we are for some reason going to equate to
“efficiency,” so we are going to creates an exception for efficiency creating
mergers. This would, however, be the very opposite of a “plain meaning”
or textualist analysis. Although terms like “competition” and “monopolize”
are indeed ambiguous, a “plain meaning” analysis of a statute that prohibits
mergers that may “substantially lessen competition” or “tend to create a
monopoly” should not be read as a codeword for a system that permits
mergers to monopoly so long as they are net efficient. The antimerger
statute contains no exceptions.
6. Implications From the “History of the Times”168
If there were any doubts about Congress’s overriding desire to protect
consumers from being forced to paying supracompetitive prices to firms
with market power, it is noteworthy that when the Sherman Act was passed
in 1890 even economists were barely aware of the concept we today call
165. See 15 U.S.C. § 18. For exceptions, see infra Part III.B, explaining the use of the
“choice” approach when non-price competition is important.
166. For a much more detailed explanation of how likely it must be that the merger raise
prices and an analysis of the merger incipiency doctrine, see supra note 161.
167. BEACH, supra note 107, at 112 (quoting Arnot v. Pittston & Elmira Coal Co., 68
N.Y. 558, 559 (1877)).
168. For Justice Scalia’s use of the “history of the times” to determine the meaning of
statutes, see supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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“allocative inefficiency.”169 In fact, the allocative inefficiency triangle that
modern members of the antitrust community see so often (illustrated in Part
III.B.5 above) never appeared in the 1890 edition of Alfred Marshall’s
famous and pathbreaking Principles of Economics treatise.170 Further,
although contemporary economists were familiar with this concept,171 there
is no reason to believe they had any influence on the passage of the
Sherman Act.172
Even though Congress’s main complaint about the trusts of the late 1800s
was not that they caused allocative inefficiency, could Congress primarily
have been concerned with corporate productive efficiency? Did Congress
pass the Sherman Act primarily to save corporate costs and increase
corporate productive efficiency? For example, did Congress or the public
in effect denounce Rockefeller because Standard Oil was so inefficient at
producing oil?
As noted in Part I.B.2, a search found no evidence Rockefeller was ever
even accused of inefficiently running Standard Oil.173 Nor did the
government, when it prosecuted the Standard Oil trust, ever assert that the
company was inefficient, or that it violated the Sherman Act because it was
inefficient.174 On the contrary, the trusts were among the most efficient
corporations of their times.175
This examination of the history of the times leaves the consumer
protection explanation as that which is most consistent with the evidence.
Congressional anger over perceived176 higher prices meant Congress was
concerned about consumers paying more to trusts, monopolies, and cartels.
Neither of the efficiency explanations (congressional anger in 1890 because
higher prices caused allocative inefficiency, or congressional anger because
the Rockefellers of the day were inefficient at production) is consistent with
the history of the times.177
169. It was not until 1938 that the first modern and rigorous discussion of allocative
efficiency appeared. See Harold Hotelling, The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of
Taxation and of Railway and Utility Rates, in 6 ECONOMETRICA 242 (1938).
170. See ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (1890). Although he devoted
seventeen pages of the 1890 edition of this landmark treatise to “The Theory of
Monopolies,” only one footnote included a reference to the concept, and the allocative
inefficiency triangle we know so well today was not drawn anywhere in this book. Id. at 466
n.1.
171. See id.
172. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER
ESSAYS 200 (1965) (“The Sherman Act was framed and debated in the pre-expert era, when
economists as a professional group were not directly consulted by the legislators. But even
if they had been, they would have given mixed and uncertain advice.”).
173. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
175. See Lande, supra note 14, at 90–93.
176. While Congress perceived that the trusts of the period were raising prices, the actual
situation is much more complex. Id. at 97–98.
177. As a double check, I challenge each reader of this article to find ten intelligent
friends and ask each: “Why might Congress have condemned cartels for raising prices?” I
strongly doubt that any of them—other than friends with antitrust or economics training—
would guess that the main problem with cartels is that they cause economic inefficiency.
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In sum, a textualist analysis shows that the key antitrust terms are either
ambiguous,178 or help support the primacy of the wealth transfer goal for
antitrust. Nothing from the historical record, by contrast, fairly can be
interpreted as suggesting that the antitrust statutes are only concerned with
efficiency.
II. THE ALLOCATIVE INEFFICIENCY EFFECTS OF MARKET POWER:
SMALL AND UNDULY DIFFICULT FOR PLAINTIFFS TO PROVE
If the antitrust laws were interpreted so that their sole goal is to enhance
economic efficiency, the principal problem with market power would be its
effects on allocative inefficiency.179 The allocative inefficiency effects of
market power, however, are relatively small. They are also extremely
difficult for plaintiffs to prove in court. For these reasons, an antitrust
regime centered around the prevention of allocative inefficiency would be
unduly weak, perhaps so weak that the antitrust laws would cease to
function effectively.
A. The Relatively Small Size of Allocative Inefficiency Compared to the
Transfer Effects of Market Power180
The manner in which the standard competition-to-monopoly diagram is
drawn makes the allocative inefficiency effects of market power appear to
be half as large as its transfer effects.181 Judge Easterbrook, for example,
drew a similar diagram, made a number of conventional and commonly
used assumptions, and on this basis showed that allocative inefficiency is
50 percent as large as the transfer effects on average.182
The author has asked his antitrust law students these questions on many occasions, and the
students always find the efficiency explanations implausible.
178. Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits “unfair methods of competition.” See 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(a)(1) (2006). Its language does not clarify whether this law’s principle concern is with
efficiency, wealth transfers, consumer choice, or with something else. However, a “plain
reading” of this statute fairly suggests that the term “unfair” must include more than
“economic efficiency.” Congress did not, after all, enact a statute that prohibits “inefficient
methods of competition.” However, I have been unable to track down contemporaneous
sources that further clarify the meaning of the term “unfair methods of competition,” other
than sources used in a traditionalist analysis of the legislative history. For these sources, see
Lande, supra note 14, at 106–51.
179. In addition, there also could be instances where a merger, for example, would
diminish innovation, and diminished innovation is another form of inefficiency. For a
discussion of this issue, see Averitt & Lande, supra note 10, at 240. Second, it is possible
that wealth that normally would be acquired by the firm with market power instead would be
transformed into inefficient rent-seeking behavior. This is sometimes called the Posnerian
Costs of monopoly. See Lande, supra note 14, at 78–79 n.54.
180. This section is based upon John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, Cartels As Rational
Business Strategy: Crime Pays, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 427 (2012), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1917657.
181. See supra fig.1.
182. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Detrebling Antitrust Damages, 28 J.L. & ECON. 445, 455
(1985). As Judge Easterbrook observed, the two-to-one ratio depends upon the assumptions
of linear demand and supply, and “[t]hese curves doubtless are not linear, but legal rules
must be derived from empirical guesses rather than exhaustive investigation.” Id.
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If Judge Easterbrook were correct, this would mean that “what’s wrong”
with market power—a crucial issue in an antitrust world that often trades
off anticompetitive and procompetitive effects—would be tripled if the
transfer effects of market power were added to its allocative inefficiency
effects, and both were considered to be anticompetitive. It is, however,
extremely unlikely that the allocative inefficiency from market power is on
average half as large as its transfer effects.
The evidence shows that allocative inefficiency effects of market power
are on average much smaller relative to the transfer effects. Unfortunately,
we do not know for a statistically significant number of typical cartels or
monopolies how large either effect is. My coauthor on another project,
Prof. John Connor, surveyed the literature on the relative sizes of the
allocative inefficiency and transfer effects of market power. He calculated
a representative ratio or range based on economic theory and the best
empirical literature on cartels and monopolies. Dr. Connor also was able to
locate a number of technically impressive empirical studies of monopolies
and cartels that provided both estimates, and he also made estimates based
upon a number of relatively realistic theoretical assumptions.183
Dr. Connor found that on average the allocative inefficiency effects are
probably only 3 percent to 20 percent as large as the transfer effects.184
There’s an alternative way to phrase this finding. If you start with the
inefficiency effects of market power and then include its transfer effects,
“what’s wrong” with market power would increase by at least a factor of
five, and maybe even by a factor of thirty-three. Conversely, if the transfer
effects are not counted, the allocative inefficiency effects of market usually
would be so small they usually would be outweighed by even a tiny cost
savings.185

183. An earlier estimate of these ratios, albeit for the economy as a whole, was calculated
in F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 667–78 (3d ed. 1990). They evaluated and compared empirical estimates of
the relative sizes of the deadweight loss (0.5 to 2.0 percent of GNP) and transfer effects
(probably at the lower end of the range of 3 to 12 percent) due to the exercise of market
power in the whole U.S. economy in the 1950s to 1970s. Economy-wide analyses tend to
produce lower welfare losses than do disaggregated industry studies, but the effect on the
ratio of interest is uncertain. See id. at 664. Despite the many caveats expressed by Scherer
and Ross about these numbers, their average deadweight loss/transfer ratio appears to be
roughly 28 percent. The lowest ratio is perhaps about 8 percent and the highest 36 percent.
An efficiency approach that ignored the wealth transfer effects of market power
would tend to permit mergers and even collusion in markets with inelastic demand, such as
insulin. By contrast, markets for luxury goods would tend to have demand that is much
more elastic. Market power in these markets would thus tend to produce larger amounts of
allocative inefficiency. Ironically, an efficiency based antitrust policy would tend to permit
price increases for necessities and be more likely to challenge higher prices for nonessential
goods! See Email from Sandeep Vaheesan to Robert H. Lande (Feb. 13, 2013, 10:30 a.m.
EST) (on file with author).
184. See Connor & Lande, supra note 180 at 460.
185. For the particular requirements, see supra note 2.
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B. The Very Heavy Burden of Demonstrating Allocative Inefficiency Would
Be on the Enforcers
My recent search for U.S. federal antitrust cases that calculated the
allocative efficiency effects of market power found no positive results.186
Apparently there has been only one U.S.187 case that has even claimed to
attempt this undertaking in a published opinion, United States v. BNS
Inc.188 This case purported to calculate the allocative inefficiency losses
(also known as the deadweight welfare losses) as follows:
If the injunction thwarts the takeover, the injunction will deprive BNS
of ownership and control of a company that BNS has calculated to be
worth at least $420,000,000 more than the preexisting market value. This
is irreparable harm. The injunction will deprive Koppers’ shareholders of
a premium in the same amount. This is irreparable harm. . . . The reason
is that BNS is confident it can make Koppers more productive, and hence
more profitable, than Koppers is on its own . . . . Assuming BNS is
successful, the takeover is efficient in that it transfers assets to new
owners who can deploy them more productively—to the extent that the
nation’s economic welfare will increase by upwards of $420,000,000.
....
The injunction imperils the takeover and so threatens to choke off this
large increase in economic welfare. In addition, the injunction will set a
precedent that may discourage efficient transfers of control in the future.
. . . . The public interest in efficient transfers relates to a possible
deadweight loss in the economy of $420,000,000. The balance of
hardships weighs heavily against Koppers—against the injunction. The
district court abused its discretion by granting the injunction.189

However, the $420 million potential gain discussed in this case almost
certainly does not constitute a true deadweight loss. Rather, it appears to be
186. On September 14, 2012, Robert Pool searched Westlaw, LexisNexis, and Bloomberg
for cases containing “antitrust” or “Sherman Act” and also containing “allocative
efficiency,” “allocative inefficiency,” or “deadweight loss” or “deadweight welfare loss.”
His searches found 74, 68, and 72 cases, respectively. None of these cases calculated the
size of the allocative inefficiency. A 1991 article similarly reported that allocative
inefficiency had never been awarded in an antitrust case. David C. Hjelmfelt & Channing D.
Strother, Jr., Antitrust Damages for Consumer Welfare Loss, 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 505
(1991).
187. There also was a Canadian antitrust case that calculated the size of the allocative
inefficiency effects of market power. The allocative inefficiency was found to be roughly
1/14 as large as the transfer effects of the market power in question (3 million versus 43
million Canadian dollars). See Alan A. Fisher, Robert H. Lande & Stephen F. Ross,
Legalizing Merger to Monopoly and Higher Prices: The Canadian Competition Tribunal
Gets It Wrong, 15 ANTITRUST MAGAZINE, no. 1, 2000, available at http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1358448. The Canadian Competition Tribunal predicted a
proposed propane merger would raise prices by 8 percent, which came to $43 million, and
also produce another $3 million in allocative inefficiency losses (a 7 percent ratio). Id. The
anticipated allocative inefficiency of approximately $3 million was approximately 0.5
percent of the combined firms’ anticipated annual sales of $585 million. Id.
188. 848 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1988).
189. Id. at 953 (footnote omitted).
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a control premium, a potential productive efficiency gain, a potential
savings in X efficiency, and/or potential monopoly profits. None of these is
the same as the allocative inefficiency effects of market power.
Strikingly, however, there is a line of cases, beginning with Rebel Oil Co.
v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,190 which holds that an act is anticompetitive only
when it harms allocative efficiency—and raises prices:
Accordingly, an act is deemed anticompetitive under the Sherman Act
only when it harms both allocative efficiency and raises the prices of
goods above competitive levels or diminishes their quality.191

It is difficult to know what is meant by the requirement that to be
anticompetitive an act both raise price and harm allocative inefficiency.
One possibility is that the court is using a pure efficiency standard and
wants to be clear that plaintiff must demonstrate more than
supracompetitive prices: it must demonstrate that the higher prices result in
allocative inefficiency, not just a transfer of wealth to the alleged violator.
Alternatively, the court might have in mind a practice such as RPM, which
can raise prices for reasons that can be explained by efficiencies.192 In
these circumstances the RPM would cause higher prices, yet be efficient.
Or the court could simply be using the terms in an imprecise manner.
Regardless, a number of cases that follow Rebel Oil explicitly place the
burden of proving the allocative inefficiency harms of market power on
plaintiffs. For example, Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic International, Inc.193 held:
The plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating damage to competition with
“specific factual allegations.” Actual anticompetitive effects include, but
are not limited to, reduction of output, increase in price, or deterioration in
quality. Higher prices alone are not the “epitome” of anticompetitive
harm (as Jacobs claims). Rather, consumer welfare, understood in the
sense of allocative efficiency, is the animating concern of the Sherman
Act . . . . By “anticompetitive,” the law means that a given practice both
harms allocative efficiency and could “raise[ ] the prices of goods above
competitive levels or diminish[ ] their quality,” in addition to other
possible anticompetitive effects such as those above.194

190. 51 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Hilton v. Children’s Hosp. San Diego,
315 F. App’x 607, 609 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he antitrust laws are only concerned with acts
that harm ‘allocative efficiency and raise[] the price of goods above their competitive level
or diminish[] their quality.’” (quoting Poolwater Prods. v. Olin Corp., 258 F.3d 1024, 1034
(9th Cir. 2001))); see also Tunis Bros. v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715, 728 (3d Cir. 1992);
Nelson v. Monroe Reg’l Med. Ctr., 925 F.2d 1555, 1564 (7th Cir. 1991); In re NCAA I-A
Walk-On Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1151 (W.D. Wash. 2005)
(“Generally, the test for harm to competition is whether consumer welfare has been harmed
such that there has been a decrease in allocative efficiency and an increase in price.”).
191. Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at 1433; cf. Brook Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223–24 (1993) (below-cost pricing is not anticompetitive in itself
because, although it causes allocative inefficiency, it brings lower aggregate prices in the
market).
192. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
193. 626 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2010).
194. Id. at 1339 (citations omitted).
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Additionally, consider United National Maintenance, Inc. v. San Diego
Convention Center Corp.195:
Plaintiff must show Defendant’s conduct “harms consumer welfare,” i.e.,
“it harms both allocative efficiency and raises the price of goods above
competitive levels or diminishes their quality.” Allocative inefficiency
occurs when market participants who can use resources most efficiently
lack access to those resources because of a defendant’s conduct.196

Thus, the enforcers and private plaintiffs’ task of demonstrating the
allocative inefficiency effects of market power would lead antitrust into
virtually uncharted waters that no plaintiff has ever navigated successfully,
with the burden of proof on plaintiffs. Because proof of the allocative
inefficiency effects of market power has virtually never been accomplished
successfully in an antitrust case, it is difficult to know how often the
enforcers would be able to demonstrate its existence or magnitude in
litigation settings.
C. An Efficiency Balancing Is Likely To Be Unduly Complex Compared to
a Price (or Wealth Transfer or Stealing) Test197
A wealth transfer or “price to consumers” approach has another
advantage over an economic efficiency standard. The price standard is
more workable because its modeling is more straightforward. Under the
price standard, one must describe the industry and identify the values of a
few underlying parameters to determine how large cost savings would have
to be to prevent the price from rising or the output from falling.198 This
task alone is extremely difficult.199 However, an economic efficiency
standard would be more complex and require much more information.
Unlike a price (wealth transfer) standard, an efficiency-based approach
would require the decision maker to also evaluate the potential efficiency
gains from a merger even after determining that the merger would probably
lead to an increase in price and a fall in output. This tradeoff analysis
would require that one know the firm’s marginal cost and marginal revenue
schedules over the relevant output ranges,200 in addition to all the
information needed to analyze a merger under the price standard.
195. No. 07-CV-2172 BEN (JMA), 2010 WL 3034024 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 03, 2010).
196. Id. at *7 (quoting Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at 1433).
197. This subsection is based upon Fisher, Johnson & Lande, supra note 2, at 809–13. See
also Alan A. Fisher, Robert H. Lande & Walter Vandaele, Afterword: Could a Merger Lead
to Both a Monopoly and a Lower Price?, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1697 (1983); Alan Fisher &
Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1580
(1983), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1701785.
198. See Fisher, Johnson & Lande, supra note 2, at 809–13.
199. See id.
200. To use an economic efficiency criterion, one must examine the effects of changes in
prices and output levels. Such model building would be vastly more complex than model
building for an unchanged output and would also require restrictive (perhaps unrealistic)
assumptions of the behavior of marginal cost and marginal revenue as output changes. This
complexity underlies our finding that the price criterion is simpler and more workable than
the economic efficiency standard in the context of oligopoly. For a discussion, see id.
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The price standard also has an important empirical advantage. It may
sometimes be possible to observe after the fact (for a joint venture, for
example) whether the price rose and output fell. By contrast, the tradeoff
under an economic efficiency test—whether marginal costs fell sufficiently
to offset the adverse effects of reduced output—usually would elude
hindsight even if prices could be shown to rise.
Economic efficiency advocates often recognize the administrative
complexity of their standard and therefore propose a simplified operational
approximation—an output rule that is virtually identical to the price
standard!201 Indeed, when the Reagan Administration proposed legislative
reform of the Clayton Act in 1986, it recommended using an explicit price
standard to evaluate mergers.202
An efficiency standard would also need to assess, in those circumstances
where price increased, the likelihood that the requisite cost savings would
actually arise.203 Even when a transaction or arrangement will increase
efficiency, the adjustment could be stormy, and the firms’ marginal costs
may decline only after a lengthy period. Moreover, at least one of the firms
might have achieved comparable efficiency gains through less
anticompetitive means, such as a licensing arrangement, joint venture, or
less anticompetitive scenario.
The tradeoff calculations would typically be complex in practice,
especially given the creativity of antitrust attorneys and economists. During
litigation each side would have experts with very different opinions of the
appropriate model and values of the parameters. Each side would try to
convince or confuse a judge whose training and experience would typically
be neither in economics nor in business.
The legal system is far better suited to resolving “either-or” disputes—
will price increase or will it not increase—than to balancing factors in a
multivariable analysis—will cost savings decrease enough to compensate
for the allocative inefficiency effects of the higher prices. This is especially
201. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 31–33
(1984) (proposing a series of filters in an attempt to ensure that only practices likely to result
in reduced output or increased prices would be subject to the Rule of Reason); Richard A.
Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality,
48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 21 (1981) (proposing to make a restriction’s effect on output a central
feature of an assessment of whether it increases competition); Richard A. Posner, The Rule
of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 16–17 (1977) (proposing to determine the permissibility of restrictions on
distribution by measuring their effects on output).
202. The Merger Modernization Act of 1986 proposed changing section 7 of the Clayton
Act from a ban on mergers “substantially [likely] to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly,” 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982), to a ban on mergers likely to “increase the ability to
exercise market power.” S. 2160, 99th Cong. § 2(a) (1986). The proposed bill defined the
ability to exercise market power as “the ability of one or more firms profitably to maintain
prices above competitive levels for a significant period of time.” Id. § 2(d).
203. Experts have tended to make grossly inaccurate predictions that, to be accurate,
must include predictions of how far into the future efficiencies will occur, and an appropriate
discount rate. These additional complexities can affect the computations of both efficiency
gains and inefficiency losses from mergers. See Fisher & Lande, supra 197, at 1619–24.
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true under the constraints of litigation, which could include preliminary
injunction settings.204 Indeed, both acquiring firms and the antitrust
agencies have a poor record in predicting efficiency effects in actual
cases,205 and the agencies and reviewing courts are likely to make incorrect
decisions a high percentage of the time.
III. WHEN CONSUMER CHOICE CONSIDERATIONS ARE CRUCIAL
The antitrust statutes are not written in terms of the price effects of
market power. They focus instead on more general principles. Section 1 of
the Sherman Act, for example, is concerned with arrangements in “restraint
of trade,”206 not arrangements that “lead to higher prices.” Section 2
prohibits “monopolization” of “commerce,”207 not “monopoly pricing.” As
noted above, a contract, combination, or conspiracy that “restrains” trade
can merely distort or change it, rather than simply diminish its size or
quantity. In other words, a “restraint” of trade also could distort the
competitive array of offerings in the market, not just the market’s price
offerings. A fair reading of the Sherman Act suggests that every aspect of
competition important to consumers—price, quality, variety, etc.—was
meant to be the concern of the antitrust statutes.208
Normally, however, antitrust can simply focus on prices—an approach
that prevents transfers of wealth from consumers to firms with market
power—even though non-price competition is often crucial to consumer
welfare. This is because normally a market that is price competitive also
will produce optimal non-price competition. But this is not always true.
Suppose the twenty leading media companies—including television
networks, radio networks, and newspaper chains—all wanted to merge the
entirety of their news operations. This surely would lead to tremendous
cost saving efficiencies in the costs of reporting the news. But would it lead
to any price increases? Perhaps not. After all, these news operations would
all be competing for advertising dollars and personnel with many other
television and radio shows and also with a vast number of internet
operations. Price effects would be very difficult to show.

204. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers’ Conscious Design
Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1534–42 (1973) (discussing
the notion of “polycentric” decision making in the design defect context). Professor
Henderson drew this concept from Lon L. Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule of Law, 54 AM.
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 1 (1960), and M. POLANYI, THE LOGIC OF LIBERTY 170–84 (1951).
205. See Fisher, Johnson & Lande, supra note 2, at 783 n.23.
206. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
207. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
208. As noted in DILLON, supra note 96, at 430 n.3 (“A monopoly exists when the sale of
any merchandise or commodity is restrained to one or to a certain number (11 Co. 86); and it
has three inseparable consequents,—the increase of the price, the badness of the wares, the
impoverishment of others.”). The Case of Monopolies, similarly holds: “The 2d . . . incident
to a monopoly is, that after the monopoly granted, the commodity is not so good and
merchantable as it was before . . . .” Darcy v. Allein (The Case of Monopolies), [1601] 77
E.R. 1260, 1263; see also supra note 118.
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However, in case this combination might produce some price effects,
also assume that these twenty media companies all agreed with the
enforcement authorities that if they were allowed to merge, they would not
raise the price of anything including advertising rates, newspapers, or any
other priced item.209 Therefore this merger would generate tremendous
efficiencies but would not lead to any price increases. Under a price or
efficiency approach to competition law it should be permitted.
But it should not be permitted under the consumer choice approach to
antitrust law, because the most serious harms from this newsgathering
merger can best be expressed in terms of a loss of the consumer choice that
the free market otherwise would bring. This choice can be illustrated by
perspectives, editorial independence, and the quality and varieties of
approaches to news coverage. A choice approach to antitrust would reflect
these concerns much better than antitrust law centered around price or
efficiency.
The Supreme Court recently stressed the importance of non-price
competition in Leegin, explaining that it is desirable when competition
gives “consumers more options so that they can choose among low-price,
low-service brands; high-price, high-service brands; and brands that fall in
between.”210 There are a large number and variety of cases that cannot be
explained just by a quest for efficiency or low prices. The best way to
analyze and explain these cases is in terms of consumer choice.211
With this as background, the remainder of this section will first define the
consumer choice approach to competition law—what it means, including
how it differs from the efficiency or price approaches, and how it often is
embodied in current U.S. decisions. Second, this section will discuss
specific types of situations where a consumer choice focus makes or would
make a difference. In every case it would produce better results than the
efficiency or price approaches.
A. What Is the “Consumer Choice” Approach to Antitrust Law?
If you examine every type of antitrust law violation—from price fixing to
predation—and ask what they have in common, the answer is that they all
significantly restrict consumer choice. They all significantly and artificially
distort or diminish the choices that otherwise would be offered by the free
market. Three brief examples are: (1) cartels, which certainly do this, by
replacing the price and non-price options that should result from
competition, by price and non-price terms set by collusion; (2) mergers that
209. Also assume that all twenty companies also agreed not to lower the wages they paid
their employees. For this reason the merger would not lead to monopsony concerns.
210. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 890 (2007).
211. In addition to the examples in this Article that document the use of the consumer
choice approach to antitrust law, see Averitt & Lande, supra note 10, at 196–237, and Neil
W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of Antitrust and
Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 713, 713–22 (1997), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1134798.
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lead to market power; and (3) monopolization by predation, which also
leads to fewer price and non-price choices than the free market would offer.
In fact, every antitrust law or competition law violation distorts consumer
choices.212
You might now wonder how a consumer choice approach differs from
either a price approach or an efficiency approach? It includes both. It
includes price considerations because price is almost always an important
choice variable for consumers. It also includes efficiency because
efficiencies can affect choices, especially in the long run.
But, crucially, the choice approach also includes a heightened concern
with every significant non-price dimension of competition that consumers
care about. In theory these factors are supposed to be considered under
every approach. But as a practical matter, under a price or efficiency
approach, factors such as service, innovation, quality, privacy, and variety
are as a practical matter sometimes relegated to the footnotes of the
analysis, where they are too often forgotten. The consumer choice
approach, by contrast, in effect moves non-price issues up into the text
where they play a much more prominent role in the analysis and result.
Near the end of this Article, the evolution of the U.S. Merger Guidelines
will illustrate the differing emphases that have been given to choice issues
over time.
There are other crucial elements of a consumer choice approach that
should be stressed. First, not every decrease in consumer choice counts as
an injury to competition. Only significant decreases count, which would
not include, for example, a reduction from ten choices down to nine!
Second, more choice is not necessarily good, because too much choice can
cause confusion and can as a practical matter mean that costs increase
unduly.213 For this reason, the goal of competition policy should not be to
maximize consumer choice. Rather, it should be to eliminate practices that
artificially restrict the choices that the free market would have provided.
Third, as noted earlier, every competition law violation reduces consumer
choice, but the converse is not true. It is not true that every reduction in
consumer choice is a competition law violation. Some reductions in
consumer choice—such as when a monopolist reduces its variety of
offerings—do not violate any law. Other reductions in choice are consumer
protection violations.214
B. When Would the Consumer Choice Approach Make a Difference?
At this point you might well be thinking that of course competition law
should be concerned about more than just price. You might say that nonprice issues should certainly count and should count heavily. But, if a
market is competitive in terms of price, won’t it also be competitive in
212. See Averitt & Lande, supra note 211, at 718–20.
213. See Averitt & Lande, supra note 10, at 184 n.23, 191–95.
214. See Averitt & Lande, supra note 211, at 720–22.
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terms of non-price issues? For example, if a market has four firms, and if
four firms are enough to have optimal price competition, won’t these same
four firms also insure optimal non-price competition? If so, is there a
reason to not just use a price standard? Won’t a price focus automatically
give us optimal non-price competition as well?
Normally, it would indeed. Normally there is no difference between a
choice approach and a price approach and therefore little benefit to using a
choice standard.215
But at other times the choice approach would make a significant
difference in both the analysis and the result. The remainder of this section
will analyze specific cases and categories of cases where a choice analysis
would make a significant difference and where the choice analysis and
result would be superior.
1. Cases in Markets with Little or No Price Competition
The first category of cases involves conduct in markets with little or no
price competition. This could occur as a result of regulation, of industry
wide joint ventures, or third-party payers. In these situations there is no
way to properly assess consumer welfare without focusing explicitly on
non-price issues.
An example from the United States involves airlines back when their
prices were regulated. During this period, airlines still competed in terms
of service.216 Suppose that every U.S. airline had wanted to merge during
this period. Why not allow these mergers? Prices were regulated and could
not increase. Moreover, there might have been efficiencies from the
mergers. The reason the airlines were not allowed to merge is that we
wanted these airlines to engage in non-price competition, specifically, in
service competition.
In fact, similar mergers were allowed on these grounds involving the
market for taxicabs in Montgomery County, Maryland, an area very close to
Washington, D.C. The local regulators allowed every major taxicab
company to merge because their prices were regulated.217 How could there
possibly have been any harm from these mergers? As one could predict,
the quality of taxicab service went down significantly because the mergers
created a near monopoly. Consumers suffered a harm that could not be
picked up by a price or cost savings analysis.
Another important example is the FTC’s recent Realcomp II case.218
This involved a conspiracy among established full-service, high-priced real
estate brokers to eliminate real estate brokers that provided only some
215. Even for these situations, however, the consumer choice terminology is a better way
of explaining the benefits of antitrust law to a lay audience or to judges than a price or
efficiency approach.
216. See Averitt & Lande, supra note 10, at 196–97.
217. Id. at 233–35.
218. In re Realcomp II, Ltd., No. 9320, 2009 WL 6936319 (F.T.C. Oct. 30, 2009),
petition for review denied, 635 F.3d 815 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 132 S. Ct. 400 (2011).
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specific brokerage services, but did so for a much lower price. The FTC
and the reviewing court held that consumers were entitled to have the lowcost, low-service option. It was not acceptable for the real estate broker
cartel to only provide the full-service, high-cost option. Even though there
was no evidence that the price of any real estate service increased, the court
held that the conspiracy to eliminate choices from the marketplace violated
the FTC Act.219
2. Conduct That Impairs Consumers’ Decision-Making Ability
A second category of cases when a consumer choice approach is superior
involves conduct that increases consumers’ search costs or otherwise
impairs their decision-making ability. This conduct causes consumers to
obtain products or services less suited to their needs, in addition to
producing higher prices. There are a large number of cases that have
involved restrictions on advertising by lawyers, dentists, opticians,
engineers, etc.
In each of these cases the prices of the services in question—legal,
dental, optical, etc.—increased as a result of the advertising restrictions.
This was, of course, the purpose of the restraints. In addition, the
prohibitions against advertising also made it hard for consumers to choose
the service that best suited their needs. Consumers were also harmed by
their inability to select the engineer, lawyer, or optician that was optimal for
them.
Efficiencies were claimed for all the practices. Naturally! Depending
upon the case, the efficiencies were more believable or less believable.
Most of these advertising restrictions were evaluated under the rule of
reason. This rule states that the negative effects of the restrictions—both
the higher prices and the diminished consumer choice—should be balanced
against the practices’ efficiencies. The balance easily could come out
differently if only the price effects were included on the negative side of the
tradeoff. However, a tradeoff that also included the negative effects on
consumer choice (resulting from consumers’ inability to find the best
lawyer, engineer, etc., for their purposes) would more accurately reflect the
effects of the restrictions on consumer welfare.
Another notable consumer search cost case, Detroit Auto Dealers
Ass’n,220 involved a conspiracy by every automobile dealer in a large
metropolitan area to essentially stay open for business only from nine to
five on weekdays.221 This led to higher prices for automobiles. The
decreased shopping time also caused consumers to purchase cars less
suitable for their needs.

219. Id. at *44.
220. In re Detroit Auto Dealers Ass’n, 111 F.T.C. 417 (1989).
221. There were, however, exceptions to this prohibition. For an analysis of this case, see
Averitt & Lande, supra note 10, at 200–01.

2396

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

In Detroit Auto Dealers—or in any of the vast majority of consumers’
search cost cases that are decided under the rule of reason—the non-price
harms to consumers should also be included, in addition to the price harms.
Their combination should be weighed against any efficiencies from the
practices. In practice, adding the non-price harms often could make a
crucial difference in the outcome.
3. Markets Where Firms Primarily Compete Through Choice Competition
The final category of cases involves markets in which firms compete
primarily through independent product development, quality, variety, and
creativity, rather than through price. Effective competition in these
industries may sometimes require more independent centers of decision
making than are required to ensure price competition. Market concentration
principles taken from a price context may not ensure robust competition in
the ways that are most important to consumers. In these cases we care
about artificially diminished consumer choice—even if prices are
competitive. For this reason, in these markets a price standard is simply
inadequate.
The media surely is an area where we care a lot about independent
judgment, independent decision making, and creativity. It is possible to
further analyze examples from this industry by contrasting them to a more
conventional example of a merger of cookie companies. Suppose there
were only four firms that made cookies, that two of them wanted to merge,
and that three firms would be enough to yield effective price competition.
If consumers want 20 or 200 different types of cookies, the remaining three
firms would supply them. For this hypothetical four-to-three merger there
would be no advantage to using a choice standard over a price standard or
an efficiency standard. The reason is that the owners of the cookie
companies do not care which cookies their customers eat, so they will
produce whatever kinds of cookies that consumers desire.
But this might not always apply in the media sector. The media owners
might have distinct preferences concerning the editorial slant of the news.
Within limits, they may be able to slant their content or coverage.
Moreover, the media owners might have unconscious biases and
presuppositions, so even if they have the best intentions they might not be
able to supply the full range of views. While companies easily can make all
different types of cookies, it is much more difficult to hold all sorts of
different worldviews.
Another area with special choice concerns is high technology, where
innovation is especially crucial. It is virtually meaningless to try to use a
price standard to evaluate the effects of a merger or joint venture on future
technology, since by definition that future technology does not yet exist.
For cases in the defense, pharmaceutical, computer, or other high-tech
sectors, to ensure the optimal level of future consumer choice we want
divergent sources of current innovation. In other words, in some markets,
competition in terms of consumer choice (in terms of innovation, ideas,
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quality, privacy and/or variety) can be even more important than
competition in terms of price or cost savings.
There certainly have been high-tech cases where this concern with
choices seems to have affected the analysis and the ultimate decision. For
example, there have been mergers in the pharmaceutical industry where the
FTC seemed to require one more firm to innovate than normally would
have been required simply for price competition.222 There have also been
defense sector mergers where the U.S. Justice Department appears to have
required, for the sake of optimal innovation, one more firm than usual.223
C. Implementation Issues
Antitrust cannot consider adopting a goal unless it can be implemented in
a relatively objective, predictable manner. How does the choice approach
compare to the other possible goals by this criteria? What are the guiding
principles for determining how much weight to give to significant decreases
in consumer choice? How can we conduct the analysis relatively
objectively?
Mergers might be the easiest place to discuss implementation issues.224
As a practical matter, how would we implement these consumer choice
concerns, especially in a sector like the media, high technology,
entertainment, or fashion, where choice concerns might be especially
important? In three possible ways:
(1) As a tie-breaker or plus factor. If we were deciding the legality of a
media merger, for example, and if we were just on the margin if we only
considered price effects, choice considerations should cause us to
challenge the merger.
(2) As an implicit factor that would operate within the current structure of
the Merger Guidelines and would, as an informal matter, give
discretionary weight to non-price choice considerations in the enforcers’
analysis. Suppose that for industries where price competition was most
important, the enforcers would challenge twenty percent of aboveGuideline mergers. But perhaps for those industries where consumer
choice issues were especially crucial—for mergers involving sectors such
as the media, entertainment, or fashion—the enforcers would block forty
percent of above-Guideline mergers. To implement choice concerns this
way, as an informal matter of the enforcers’ discretion, the HerfindahlHirschman Index (HHI) levels in the Guidelines would not be changed.
But the Guidelines would be enforced more vigorously whenever choice
competition was especially important.
(3) Change the Merger Guidelines and make choice analysis a separate
explicit factor in the merger review process. Under this approach, a
222. See, e.g., In re Glaxo Wellcome P.L.C., 131 F.T.C. 56 (2001).
223. See, e.g, Verified Complaint at 1–4, United States v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No.
1:98CV00731 (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 1998), 1998 WL 35242728.
224. For a fuller discussion of these issues, see Averitt & Lande, supra note 10, at 243–
48.
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merger should be challenged either if it was likely to lead to higher prices,
or if it was likely to lead to significantly less consumer choice because the
merger was likely to lead to less innovation (the most important factor
that determines consumer choice in the long run).

The merger investigation would make a separate, high-priority inquiry
into both the price and the innovation effects of the merger. This inquiry
could lead to a different result from a price-based inquiry, especially
because not every company within an industry competes substantially
through innovation. Some firms instead largely compete by making
existing products less expensively, by superior marketing, by superior
service, etc. This would be somewhat different from attempting to predict
whether a particular merger would lead to more or to less innovation.
Rather, it would mean attempting to ascertain whether particular firms
historically had been centers of independent innovation.
Here is how this inquiry could work. Suppose that a high tech industry
consists of five firms: firms A, B, C, D, and E. Suppose we also believe that
three firms are enough to have effective price competition, and also that
three firms is enough for effective innovation competition. But suppose
that only firms A, B, and C compete significantly by innovating, that only
these three firms have large R & D budgets, and that only these three have a
history of making significant innovations. Suppose that Firm D competes
in other ways—perhaps it is an imitator that makes existing products less
expensively, and suppose that firm E historically only competes through
superior marketing.
Suppose that firms A and B (two of the firms that compete by innovating)
want to merge. Under price analysis we should permit this merger. This is
because after the merger there would still be four firms left, and we have
stipulated that three is enough for effective price competition. But under
choice analysis we should block this merger because it is likely to lead to
less innovation, the long term source of optimal consumer choice.
Accordingly, regardless of the number of firms we believe is necessary
for effective price competition, and even if we believe that the same number
of firms will suffice for choice competition in every industry, choice
analysis sometimes could lead to tougher merger enforcement.225
D. An Example of the Increasing Use of Choice Analysis:
The Evolution of the U.S. Merger Guidelines
A striking and encouraging example of the increasing role of consumer
choice analysis in U.S. antitrust law can be found by observing the
increased importance of this subject in the Merger Guidelines. The 1992
edition barely mentions non-price competition. An introductory section
225. This is analogous to unilateral effects analysis, which essentially says that we should
be especially tough on a merger between two firms that make products within the same niche
of a relevant market, and more lenient toward mergers between producers of products that
are not similar to each other. Choice analysis arguably could be said to create a “submarket”
consisting of innovators or an “innovation market” within the overall market.
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titled “Purpose and Underlying Policy Assumptions of the Guidelines,”226
contains a dozen references in the text to “price,” the “transfer of wealth
from buyers to sellers,” and similar monetary concepts.227 Only a single
footnote suggests that merger policy includes non-price concerns.228
The 1992 Merger Guidelines thus technically permit consideration of
non-price elements of competition, but the document is structured in such a
way as not to particularly encourage this analysis. It is possible that nonprice competition might have been intended to be captured in the
Guidelines’ use of the term “price” which could have been meant to be used
in the manner that economists often use this term: price that has been
adjusted for quality, or “price” as a shorthand for both price and non-price
attributes. The Guidelines did not, however, state this. Regardless, the
1992 Guidelines were not structured to encourage this approach or to
suggest that choice considerations were a high priority.
By contrast, the 2010 Merger Guidelines have warmly embraced a
consumer choice approach: section 1, the Overview, after noting that
mergers can have price effects, states:
Enhanced market power can also be manifested in non-price terms and
conditions that adversely affect customers, including reduced product
quality, reduced product variety, reduced service, or diminished
innovation. Such non-price effects may coexist with price effects, or can
arise in their absence. When the Agencies investigate whether a merger
may lead to a substantial lessening of non-price competition, they employ
an approach analogous to that used to evaluate price competition.229

Moreover, the 2010 Guidelines contain a new section, section 6.4, titled
“Innovation and Product Variety”:
Competition often spurs firms to innovate. The Agencies may consider
whether a merger is likely to diminish innovation competition by
encouraging the merged firm to curtail its innovative efforts below the
level that would prevail in the absence of the merger. That curtailment of
innovation could take the form of reduced incentive to continue with an
226. U.S. DOJ & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 0.1 (1992).
227. Id.
228. Footnote 6 of the 1992 Merger Guidelines reads: “Sellers with market power also
may lessen competition on dimensions other than price, such as product quality, service, or
innovation.” Id. § 0.1 n.6.
The 1987 National Association of State Attorneys General (NAAG) Horizontal
Merger Guidelines reflected a similar emphasis. It states in a footnote that consumers can be
harmed by oligopoly behavior “on terms of trade other than price . . . .” NAAG HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES § 2.11 (1987), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,405, at
21,186 n.17. The footnote then elaborates this consideration at somewhat more length than
the federal guidelines. It reads in full as follows: “Tacit or active collusion on terms of trade
other than price also produces wealth transfer effects. This would include, for example, an
agreement to eliminate rivalry on service features or to limit the choices otherwise available
to consumers.” Id. Then the NAAG merger Guidelines declare, more fundamentally, that
the “central purpose” of merger law “is to prevent firms from attaining market or monopoly
power, because firms possessing such power can raise prices to consumers above
competitive levels . . . .” Id. at 21,185 (footnotes omitted).
229. U.S. DOJ & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1 (2010).
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existing product-development effort or reduced incentive to initiate
development of new products.230

This section also makes the importance of non-price competition clear:
The Agencies also consider whether a merger is likely to give the merged
firm an incentive to cease offering one of the relevant products sold by the
merging parties. Reductions in variety following a merger may or may
not be anticompetitive. Mergers can lead to the efficient consolidation of
products when variety offers little in value to customers. In other cases, a
merger may increase variety by encouraging the merged firm to reposition
its products to be more differentiated from one another.
If the merged firm would withdraw a product that a significant number
of customers strongly prefer to those products that would remain
available, this can constitute a harm to customers over and above any
effects on the price or quality of any given product. If there is evidence of
such an effect, the Agencies may inquire whether the reduction in variety
is largely due to a loss of competitive incentives attributable to the
merger.231

Even the 2010 Merger Guidelines’ Efficiencies section, which mostly is
worded in cost terms, clearly makes non-price competition a high priority:
[A] primary benefit of mergers to the economy is their potential to
generate significant efficiencies and thus enhance the merged firm’s

230. Id. § 6.4. The Guidelines continue:
The first of these effects is most likely to occur if at least one of the merging firms
is engaging in efforts to introduce new products that would capture substantial
revenues from the other merging firm. The second, longer-run effect is most likely
to occur if at least one of the merging firms has capabilities that are likely to lead it
to develop new products in the future that would capture substantial revenues from
the other merging firm. The Agencies therefore also consider whether a merger
will diminish innovation competition by combining two of a very small number of
firms with the strongest capabilities to successfully innovate in a specific direction.
The Agencies evaluate the extent to which successful innovation by one
merging firm is likely to take sales from the other, and the extent to which postmerger incentives for future innovation will be lower than those that would prevail
in the absence of the merger. The Agencies also consider whether the merger is
likely to enable innovation that would not otherwise take place, by bringing
together complementary capabilities that cannot be otherwise combined or for
some other merger-specific reason.
Id. § 6.4.
231. Id. The Guidelines continue with an illustration:
Example 21: Firm A sells a high-end product at a premium price. Firm B sells a
mid-range product at a lower price, serving customers who are more price
sensitive. Several other firms have low-end products. Firms A and B together
have a large share of the relevant market. Firm A proposes to acquire Firm B and
discontinue Firm B’s product. Firm A expects to retain most of Firm B’s
customers. Firm A may not find it profitable to raise the price of its high-end
product after the merger, because doing so would reduce its ability to retain Firm
B’s more price-sensitive customers. The Agencies may conclude that the
withdrawal of Firm B’s product results from a loss of competition and materially
harms customers.
Id.
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ability and incentive to compete, which may result in lower prices,
improved quality, enhanced service, or new products . . . .
Efficiencies also may lead to new or improved products, even if they
do not immediately and directly affect price . . . .
When evaluating the effects of a merger on innovation, the Agencies
consider the ability of the merged firm to conduct research or
development more effectively. Such efficiencies may spur innovation but
not affect short-term pricing.232

The decisions embodied in the 2010 Merger Guidelines to make choice
competition a vastly higher priority are a most welcome advance over the
1992 approach. Perhaps for the reasons given earlier in this article, the new
Merger Guidelines recognize that a concern with price and efficiency often
are insufficient and that the approach of the 1992 Merger Guidelines—
mention non-price competition only in a footnote—is inadequate. Choice
considerations are finally receiving the respect they are due.
E. Concluding Example: The Microsoft Case
The final example was analyzed and decided under a consumer choice
approach and could not have been analyzed well or decided correctly under
a price or efficiency approach. This was the most highly publicized U.S.
antitrust case of the last generation—the Microsoft case.233
The primary products in question were personal computer operating
systems and browsers. The focus of the parties’ briefs and the court
decisions was on innovation, new products, and short term and long term
consumer choice. In contrast, the briefs and decisions paid little attention to
the price of anything. After all, the price of the operating systems was not
an issue because Microsoft had a legal monopoly on it. The price of the
browser was not an issue because Microsoft was giving it away for free (in
fact, trying its best to give it to everyone for free). Nor were cost saving
efficiencies a significant concern.234
Rather, short-term consumer choices, and also innovation and the
resulting long term choices innovation could bring, were the key concerns.
Naturally, both sides disagreed strongly about how to maximize consumer
choice. But the important point is that consumer choice was—and should
have been—the focus of the case. By contrast, cost savings and price
were—and should have been—much lower concerns.235
The Microsoft case illustrates two important points. First, antitrust law
has long been in the process of moving from an efficiency or price approach
toward a choice approach, even if many cases do not explicitly use the

232. Id. § 10.
233. This analysis of Microsoft is based upon Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice As the
Ultimate Goal of Antitrust, 62 U. PITT L. REV. 503, 511–14 (2001), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1478680; see also United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
234. See Lande, supra note 233, at 511–14.
235. Id.
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choice terminology. Second, a price or efficiency orientation often is
inadequate to address many of our most important competition-related
concerns.
Both Microsoft and the hypothetical involving the huge media merger
presented at the beginning of this Article illustrate that the choice approach
often will lead to a better analysis and a better outcome. The choice
approach should be the normal way to analyze competition issues.
IV. CONCLUSIONS: HONESTY AND TRANSPARENCY IN GOVERNMENT
It is interesting to contemplate some possible antitrust laws our country
did not enact:
(1) We could have prevented firms from entering into “any contract,
combination, or conspiracy that is inefficient.”
(2) We could have prohibited, “inefficient methods of competition.”
(3) We could have prohibited mergers that may lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly, but added as an explicit exception, “unless that
merger produces an efficient monopoly.”
(4) We could have made it illegal to monopolize or attempt to
monopolize, and added an explicit exception for a monopoly attained by
superior efficiency or historical accident.
(5) We could have worded the antitrust statutes in price terms. We could
have prohibited “monopoly pricing” and the “price effects of collusion,”
rather than using such general terms as restraints of “trade” and
monopolization of “commerce,” terms that suggests both price and nonprice concerns.
(6) If we had wanted to encourage those corporations existing when the
Sherman Act was passed that were most efficient, we could have enacted
a “protrust” law rather than an “antitrust law,” whose preamble praised
Standard Oil and the other trusts.

We never enacted any of efficiency-oriented laws. Nevertheless, the
efficiency purist enforcer hypothesized at the beginning of this article could
easily obfuscate or conceal what they were doing and enforce the existing
laws in a manner that only maximized economic efficiency. Some previous
real enforcement heads might well have done this. This would not,
however, be a principled way to run a government. Government officials
should be honest and transparent about the policies they are pursuing, and if
the voters do not like this, they can elect new leaders.
To those who would implement an efficiency-only approach, I urge you
to be proudly clear about what you are doing. Say candidly: “I think this
merger will raise prices to consumers by 20 percent, and this cartel will
raise prices by 300 percent. This means consumers will pay an additional
$50 million to $100 million each year, all of which will enrich the
monopoly and the cartel. That is fine with me because the merger and the
collusion are net efficient.” If, however, you would not proudly and clearly
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say these things, I submit that you should not embrace the efficiency
approach to antitrust.
It is entirely understandable that many passionately wish the antitrust
statutes’ only goal was to enhance efficiency. Many consider this best for
our economy, so they would like to interpret these laws in the ways they
believe are optimal. This is understandable. But surely the Occupy Wall
Street types would reason similarly if they ever got into power. Could a
1960s style “big is bad” approach ever return to antitrust? Or should we
prevent this possibility by accurately adhering to the laws that Congress
enacted?
It is difficult to believe that Congress in 1890 passed the Sherman Act
because of its concern with the allocative inefficiency effects of
supracompetitive pricing or that efficiency was Congress’s sole goal in
1914 when it enacted the Clayton Act and the FTC Act. Rather, both a
traditional examination of the legislative history of the antitrust laws and a
textualist analysis of the antitrust statutes demonstrate the primacy of the
wealth transfer concern. The antitrust statutes are supposed to prevent
corporations from using their market power to force consumers to pay
supracompetitive prices. We could politely call this a concern with the
wealth transfer effects of market power. Or we could bluntly, but
accurately, characterize these as situations where the firms are stealing from
consumers.
To be complete, we should add that sometimes we have to focus
explicitly on consumer choice (non-price) terms, sometimes we must take
into account that the purchasers who need protection are businesses or
indirect purchasers, and sometimes we should be concerned with protecting
sellers from wealth transfers to powerful buyers with market power. But
these are the exceptions. Usually, in fact, we can simply use a price
approach to antitrust and remain faithful to Congress’s wishes. Moreover,
according to a textualist analysis, the Sherman Act contains no other
exceptions. It prohibits all private monopoly, not just monopolies acquired
by anticompetitive conduct.
As former Assistant Secretary of Defense John T. McNaughton once
said, “An outside idea has a chance to influence government policy only if
it has two characteristics. First, it can be stated in a simple declarative
sentence. Second, once stated it is obviously true.”236 The “wealth
transfer” or “preventing theft” articulation of the primary goal of antitrust
qualifies on both counts. In addition, it is perhaps midway between what
Tea Party adherents would desire and what the Occupy Wall Street
protesters would settle for. It is also the best hope for U.S./European—
indeed for worldwide—convergence around a single goal for competition
policy. It has the best chance of constituting a compromise we could all
accept.

236. See Emily Parker, To Be Read by All Parties, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2012, at BR27.

